Richards
stands apart from the theorists we have read thus far in many ways, but the
first is this: he is offering a descriptive rather than prescriptive theory of
rhetoric. He notes from the first page that the old theories of rhetoric,
exemplified with Aristotle, provided a model derived from combat, a “theory of
the battle of words” (1281). The physical spaces, the agents, and the
activities they described were scenes of combat, where, as Jacob has pointed
out, persuasion means victory. But Richards immediately contests that “persuasion
is only one among the aims of discourse” (1281) and so from our first page with
him we learned that he sought entirely different goals than the ancients.
It
follows that Richards has thus provided us with an examination of language
rather than a handbook for argumentation. That he assumes contingency and
indeterminacy in matters of truth and language sets him apart from Plato, who
dealt in absolutes. His focus on language as the beginning of the new rhetoric
rather than a subcategory of it distinguishes him from Aristotle, who began
with probability. Finally, Richard’s emphasis on the ambiguities of language
directly clash with the definition-dependent syllogistic reasoning of Ramus and
the presumed inerrancy of the Bible (and thus, words) that Astell relies on for her arguments. It’s a party at
Burke’s parlor, and Richards showed up late, drank too much, and now no one can
shut him up.
Richards’s
fundamental claim is this: the meaning of words are arbitrary and contingent. From
this claim, he subverts a common linguistic assumption that words are the basic
units which give rises to the sentence – it is, rather, the sentence which gives
meaning to the words. No word has meaning except insofar as it relates to
another word (1288), so the entire sentence provides the context for
interpreting the given meaning of each word. But even as speakers and hearers
change, so do the individual contexts which shape the meaning of the sentences
they speak.
This
raises, of course, some interesting epistemological implications. It seems to
follow that if words are arbitrary signifiers, so too must the information they
convey be. And indeed Richards seems to anticipate this in his discussion of
causality. He notes, for instance, “we distribute the titles of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’
as we please” (1284) such that cause and effect, like the sentences that express
this relationship, are arbitrary and contingent concepts. Taken a step further,
Richards seems to anticipate much of the postmodern view of social
relationships – that they, like the sentences which express them, are arbitrary
and contingent, but with the addition of social power added to the control of meaning.
I
am reminded of a recent series of discussions I have had some of my classmates.
We have been discussing the concept of “rights” as a political idea and what
that means, whether they really have a natural foundation or referent. Considering
Richards views on language, to what degree do our abstract moral ideas, such as
“rights” or “law” have meaning? Or does his program reduce them to mere words
which we have imbued with meaning for the sake of negotiating social
relationships?
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