New & [O]ld

Richards does point to a couple of ways that his New Rhetoric overlaps old Rhetoric. He is interested in units of discourse and “the purposes for which we speak and write” (1281-82). With the exception of an emphasis  on meaning, Aristotle is interested in the same kinds of things.

I am thinking about each theorist and their associated concepts as a physical shape with boundaries. That kind of mental picture allows me to visualize overlaps and supersession so that I can differentiate one theorist from another, one turn from another. So in those terms, Richards does overlap Aristotle, because they are both thinking about parts of discourse and the purposes of discourse. But as Richard indicates there is a difference in scale between Aristotle’s units of discourse – enthymemes and examples – and the units of discourse examined in the New Rhetoric – the word and even the morphemes that comprise words.

If each thinker is in part a product of their time, that makes sense. While Plato and particularly Aristotle were working in a predominantly oral society, Richards is thinking about language in the print age. Richards describes the difference between those two socio-cultural/technological composing and delivery practices as being the difference between what is able to be examined and the method of that examination. In cases of heard speeches, if someone can understand the speech in terms of its constituent parts (e.g. syllogism and example), they’re doing pretty good. But in a print society, a reader can examine a text over and over again and examine the text with a greater attention to its more microscopic parts. And those microscopic parts, the relation between those microscopic parts, and those parts of parts (as opposed to “parts is parts”) relate.

While there is some overlap, I (like Bruce and Katie) see a world of difference. The starting point of that difference is the inclusion of the expository as a purpose for writing. In the old Rhetoric – Plato, Aristotle, and Ramus, it doesn’t seem like the expository is of primary concern. Astell does point to occasions for speaking that would seem to necessitate expository speech (e.g. teaching and conversation). But because the excerpt from Astell is persuasion, and she seems to be more concerned with (true) knowledge than modes of speaking/writing, she and Richards complement and foil each other only slightly. Because Richards accounts for the expository, he has a way to talk about a distinguishing feature of New Rhetoric – meaning and misunderstanding.

When persuading, success is determined by the judgment of others. In court, I win if I win the case. In the legislative body, I win if my policy is signed into law. In the court of public opinion, I win if the subject of my speech is praised or blamed by the public. But when working with the expository, I succeed if I can communicate my intended message, and others get my meaning/understand my presentation. That “get my meaning” part is a thrilling concept, because it gets us to interpretation, intention, and close to Bitzer’s conception of context and the context’s ability to act upon the message’s reception. This is new.

Bruce did a nice job of teasing out the relationship between context and interpretation, but I want to make a couple of connections. The gap between the sign and the object being referred to by the sign is wide in Richard’s Rhetoric. Astell did write at length about confusing language, but confusion and misunderstanding are different kinds of communication issues. Aristotle’s means were geared toward effectiveness with audiences in occasions, so there is a sensitivity to context. Still, Aristotle doesn’t account for a distance between sign and referent – just message and goal. Likewise, Plato’s soul-leading gets the listener to a predetermined point – either closer or further away from the truth. But language is either true or not true, and the rhetor knows the difference. The notion that a message must be interpreted and can be misunderstood is much different than our previous readings/conceptions of rhetoric.

To address Bruce: I think Richards is a precursor to the postmodernists b/c he’s a modernist. But I place Richards fairly squarely on the conservative side. To focus on misunderstanding implies that there is a right/wrong way to understand something, and that implies objectivity. I guess you might say something about intentionality of language, but I’ve never been comfortable with that idea as a foundation for any kind of claim.

To mention the pedagogical component: Plato was interested in getting students to true knowledge, by using a precise method of discovery, the dialectic. Aristotle was interested in acquainting students with means of persuasion, specific and general material means for speech-making, to develop new materials (artistic proof). Astell was trying to provide women access to knowledge, and she pointed to some materials that should be used (e.g. devotionals and conversation). Ramus was interested in clarifying the material means of doing rhetoric. In each of these cases, there is an acquiring action for the student. The student gets a hold of materials. But Richards is interested in something else from the get-go. Richards is interested in “saying clearly what one wishes to say when there is an abundance of material” (1274). Richards is working with some ideas that are much closer to writing studies than rhetoric a la handbook. He is looking at relations – comparative and causal – between people, written & unwritten language, contexts, and parts of parts of language among other parts of parts of language.