New Sources of Rhetoric

Campbell and Anzaldua both focus on marginalized groups of people, women for Campbell and all people fighting oppression (homosexuals, people of color and diverse cultural backgrounds, and women) for Anzaldua. Campbell and Anzaldua discuss how rhetoric created by white, Western men is not a sufficient mode of communication for these groups and explain how these groups use their own brands of rhetoric for liberation and expression. 

Campbell argues that women's rhetoric is a "distinctive genre" since it attacks the the values of the cultural context in which it occurs (126). Throughout her article, Campbell describes women's rhetoric as "a rhetoric of intense moral conflict," since it contradicts traditional women's roles and cultural values in American society. Campbell argues that women are denied the democratic values that dominate American culture (equality, achievement, and independence), and feminist rhetoric uses distinctively unique methods that attack these dominant American values. Feminist rhetoric offers women the tools they need for liberation; whereas, traditional rhetoric (with an expert persuading the masses and the speaker's adaptation to audience norms) would only encourage women's oppression. According to Campbell, "This rather "anti-rhetorical" style is chosen on substantive grounds because rhetorical transactions with these features encourage submissiveness and passivity in the audience--qualities at odds with a fundamental goal of feminist advocacy--self-determination (127-128). Instead, feminist rhetoric employs "consciousness raising" as a mode for rhetorical transaction (128). 

Since leaders would encourage oppression and submissiveness, feminist rhetoric, according to Campbell, involves small, leaderless groups in which every woman leads and every woman is an expert. Women are encouraged to speak about their personal experiences in order to "make the personal political: to create awareness that what were thought to be personal deficiencies and individual problems are common and shared, a result of their position as women" (128). In this model, there is not one message being conveyed, as participants should only try to understand their lives as women and find their own truths. The stylistic features of this rhetoric are: "affirmation of the affective, of the validity of personal experience, of the necessity for self-exposure and self-criticism, of the value of dialogue, and of the goal of autonomous, individual decision making" (128). Campbell uses the metaphor of oxymoron for the rhetoric of women's liberation since it violates and transforms the traditional modes of rhetoric and argumentation. 

Anzaldua likewise argues that traditional rhetoric coming from an ethnocentric, Western cannon is not a sufficient mode of communication for oppressed people. Anzaldua argues that Western art is "always whole and always in power" (1593). Instead of learning from and respecting different cultures, Westerners borrow art from other cultures and exploit it with no respect for its traditional origins. Anzaldua insists, "instead of surreptitiously ripping off the vital energy of people of color and putting it to commercial use, whites could allow themselves to share and exchange and learn from us in a respectful way" (1593). Anzaldua describes her stories as performances that have identities; they are enacted when spoken or read. She in turn, associates whites with sterility and a loss of spiritual roots and states that Westerners think of art works as dead objects (1592). For Anzaldua, composing solely in English would not allow her to communicate her true identity. Instead she finds the need to speak a variation of two languages, Spanglish, since ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity" (1588).     

Anzaldua explains how culturally oppressed groups exist in liminal spaces, in borderlands between the dominant groups and their ancestral homelands. Such a position creates a dual identity; people are not quite Anglo-American and not quite Mexican (in Anzaldua's case), but a hybrid of two cultures exhibiting varying degrees of each (1590). Anzaldua explains that in this borderland conflict, sometimes one culture cancels the other out, making her feel like a no one. Yet although this space may be a painful place to exist, Anzaldua suggests that there is an opportunity in the borderland for discursive resources. When Anzaldua states, "A veces no soy nada ni nadie. Pero hasta cuando no lo soy, lo soy" or "Sometimes I am nothing and nobody. But even when I'm not, I am," she seems to suggest that existing between borders is a culture in itself and not a void between two cultures. Anzaldua goes on to state, "this mixture of races, rather than resulting in an inferior being, provides hybrid progeny, a mutable more malleable species with a rich gene pool" (1597). This mestiza consciousness can be a source for creativity since it creates a tolerance for ambiguity, unlike the Western mode of using rationality to move toward a single goal (1598). The mestiza consciousness thus creates a new consciousness since it is constantly breaking down paradigms (especially the subject-object duality) and changing the way we see reality.           

Anzaldua & Campbell

Both Campbell and Anzaldu bring to rhetoric the perspective of the female character and the female consciousness.

Anzaldu especially focuses on both a female and a cultural change in rhetoric, not explicitly stating anything about rhetoric, but noting changes in perspectives in shifts of language, such as Standard English to Chicano Spanish or dialects. I found it especially intriguing that she speaks to the legitimacy of her language; first she acknowledges the importance of language, particularly her own cultural language, by saying “I am my language” (pg 1588). Then, she says, after seeing poetry written in Tex-Mex for the first time, that “I felt like we really existed as people.” (pg 1589). The legitimacy of expression and writing for Anzaldu seems to be potent, and interestingly has shifted from previous rhetoric, where written word was not necessarily considered to be true rhetoric, in the sense of persuasion. However, Anzaldu makes it clear that for her expression, poetry, and art, in written text, is very much rhetorical, and refers to the writer as a “shape-changer,” (pg 1592) which implies that through art and poetry, as well as uninhibited self-expression, persuasion can happen.

She also speaks to not only writing but images as a powerful rhetoric, adding to the conversation tools other than language to signify meaning. Additionally, she adds to the conversation an internal process to rhetoric, or what Campbell speaks to with the notion of consciousness raising. “I am the dialogue between myself and el espiriti del mundo” (pg 1594) really grasps this point and takes it home.

Both Campbell and Anzaldu seem to not only embrace women as a part of rhetoric in the sense that women should not only participate in rhetoric but would fill a void in rhetoric as it is without women participating. They both speak to the idea of the consciousness, or internal process of rhetoric, that not many rhetoricians prior to now have touched on. The idea that rhetoric, language, and voice comes from within a person as something powerful is a change only a woman can make. :)      

Complicating Rhetoric

This week's readings are only the second and third pieces we've read by women this semester.  Astell, the first woman we read, spoke of the need for women to not speak in public, but to use private speech to influence others.  Her goal was to "remove those Prejudices that lie in the way of Truth" (852).  Her Truth is a divine Truth rooted in her Christian beliefs.  I go back and forth on what to make of Astell.  I can see Astell as preserving the tradition of male voices and male power, and I can see her as being a little ahead of her time for at least suggesting that women should have some influence, a radical notion in her day.  Like Astell, Anzaldua and Campbell seek to influence others.  Unlike Astell, Anzaldua and Campbell are not interested in accommodating the status quo, and they are not interested in truth.  Both Anzaldua and Campbell seek to use rhetoric to affect change.  In their efforts to effect change, they complicate our understanding of rhetoric.

Anzaldua says that "if you want to hurt me, talk bad about my language.  Ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity - I am my language.  Until I can take pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself" (1588).  No other rhetorician we've studied has so closely tied language to identity.  Burke describes our terministic screens that direct and deflect our attention.  Richards argues that words by themselves mean nothing, that they must be interpreted.  But Anzaldua ties language to the self, not only to the act of interpretation.  If one's language is disrespected, the person is disrespected.  Anzaldua describes the shame and hurt felt when one of her eight different languages are disrespected (1586, 1588).  She describes the opposition she faced when she wanted to teach Chicano literature to her Chicano high school students (1589).  She describes the pain of writing from as a multilingual, multiethnic woman, but how writing is healing (1594-1596).  These incidents were not just insults to her language, they were insults to her.

Anzaldua seeks to use writing to bring together the many parts of herself so she can a "mestiza" successful in "the straddling of two or more cultures" (1598).  She wants to show others how to be this mestiza: "She learns to juggle cultures.  She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode - nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned.  Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else" (1598).  Anzaldua believes that an inclusive, pluralistic view of the world can help in "healing the split that originates in the very foundation of our lives, our culture, our language, our thoughts" (1598).  She wants to change culture from one that sees the world as "us and them" to one that sees the world as an inclusive "we."  This change in culture requires each of us to value many voices and many languages.

I agree with Bruce that Campbell's main point is her concept of consciousness raising, and that this is a way of creating the audience so the audience can be persuaded.  For women's rights to advance, Campbell argues that women must join forces and understand that what women thought were shortcomings in the self are are actually systemic problems (130).  Campbell encourages women to share their experiences and connect those experiences with larger issues. Campbell says that "As a process, consciousness raising requires that the personal be transcended by moving towards the structural, that the individual be transcended by moving towards the political" (131).  In other words, women's stories must illustrate social inequities.

Campbell says that "The sex role requirements for women contradict the dominant values of American culture - self-reliance, achievement, and independence" (125-126).  She seeks to challenge this contradiction, and to change systemic sexism into a more equitable society.  Campbell suggests that the way to do this is for it to be OK for women to be self-reliant and independent.  From the theory and feminist research methodology I've read, many feminists today do not advocate for this solution.  Instead, many feminists argue for a cooperative, interdependent world view and epistemology.  While I agree with Campbell that there is unequal treatment of men and women and that we need consciousness raising, I believe women should not simply adopt traditional male roles, but women should transform these roles.

Identification and Persuasion United

I felt as if our reading of Anzaldua in many ways spoke to Campbell’s article “The Rhetoric of Women’s Liberation:  An Oxymoron.”  Anzdldua’s discussions of the various roles and identities ascribed to her as a woman, a Chicano, and a lesbian seem to address the multiplicity and differences that Campbell describes as unique in the rhetoric of women’s liberation.  Rather than persuasion, Campbell identifies consciousness raising as the central aim of women’s liberation rhetoric.  Specifically, she describes this process as:

 ...involv[ing] meetings of small, leaderless groups in which each person is encouraged to   express her personal feeling and experiences.  There is no leader, rhetor, or expert.  All participate and lead; all are considered expert.  The goal is to make the personal political:  to create awareness (through shared experiences) that what were thought to be personal deficiencies and individual problems are common and shared, a result of their position as women. (128)

Thus, the rhetoric of women’s liberation is paradoxical (or oxymoronic) in a sense—the rhetoric serves to actually create the audience.  Once the women involved can share their personal experiences and find similarities to create a feeling of unity, then more political actions can be taken.  Unlike common rhetorical situations in which a rhetor attempts to persuade an already established audience, this form of rhetoric involves everyone as rhetor and audience, seeking to create a felt sense that will lead to action.

Anzaldua discusses a similar scenario, albeit from a more personalized perspective.  She notes that, “This step is a conscious rupture with all oppressive traditions of all cultures and religions.  She communicates that rupture, documents the struggle.  She reinterprets history and, using new symbols, she shapes new myths.  She adopts new perspectives toward the darkskinned, women and queers.  She strengthens her tolerance (and intolerance) for ambiguity” (1600).  This passage illustrates Campbell’s concept of the movement from personal to political.  The struggle of women’s liberation rhetoric appears, at least in my estimation, to find unification while acknowledging difference; to find a common cause without reducing those involved to commonalities.

Essentially, the addition of this second population complicates what we know of rhetoric since it acknowledges an initial step not addressed in classical notions of rhetoric—the creation of the audience.  In many ways, I see parallels between this and Burke’s notion of identification.  Women’s liberation rhetoric seems, according to Campbell, to require identification before persuasion can happen.  Hence, rhetoric serves both purposes, with one (identification) creating the ability for the other (persuasion). 

Although these readings focused on women’s rhetoric, theoretically this concept of identification creating the exigence for persuasion could be applied to numerous movements.  Having done some research on the Tea Party movement (before I switched topics), there was strong evidence to support the assertion that identification helped created the audience to be persuaded.  Many Tea Party members are both fundamentalist Christians as well as staunchly opposed to Obama.  Once these individuals identified with one another, the movement was able to persuade the collective of the best courses of actions to reach goals that aided this shared sense of identification.  Rhetorical theory, thus, seems to be less of a debate between identification and persuasion and more of a study of how the two reciprocally influence one another.  Contemplating this second population enabled me to complicate my understanding of these rhetorical processes. 

The Influence or Contribution of A(nother) New Population

What does the experience of this second population add to rhetoric; alternatively, how does it complicate what we thought we understood about rhetoric?

A Dialogue (of Sorts)

Bruce:

Talking with Jacob the other day, we had an intriguing discussion about Bakhtin and his influence on other scholars.  Although I see Bakhtin’s influence on many postmodern rhetoricians, I find it difficult to distinguish which rhetoricians Bakhtin might have had an influence on due to the problem of translation.  I know that Bakhtin did not get translated into English until the mid 1980s—hence, his work took prominence during our field’s “social turn.”  Jacob and I discussed other translation issues historically and found it fascinating what different scholars have access to at different times.  Jacob even mentioned that he had heard that when Hemingway lived in France, the texts he had access to in English were primarily Russian texts translated into English.  The fact he was reading from one country while in another fascinated me.

Having delved into genre theory a great deal for my masters’ project, I was already quite familiar with Bakhtin’s influence on various scholars specializing in genre theory, yet, as far as rhetoricians are concerned, I’m struggling as I see his presence in many rhetoricians but cannot be sure which of them had access to them.  Going off of what Jacob and I discussed, in theory, it might have been quite possible that Foucault (living in France) had access to Bakhtin’s work earlier than many American scholars.  I’d have to say that the same goes for Derrida as well. I hesitate to include Richards since timelines do not seem to mesh rather well; however, his fascination with ambiguity seems to derive from some of Bakhtin’s concepts.  

In “The Problem of Speech Genres,” Bakhtin notes:

Language is realized in the form of individual concrete utterances (oral and written) by participants in the various areas of human activity.  These utterances reflect the specific conditions and goals of each such area not only through their content (thematic) and linguistic style, that is, the selection of the lexical, phraseological, and grammatical resources of the language, but above all through their compositional structure.  All three of these aspects—thematic content, style, and compositional structure—are inseparably linked to the whole of the utterance and are equally deterimined by the specific nature of the particular sphere of communication.  Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of the utterances.  These we may call speech genres. (1227)

I quoted this passage in its entirety since various aspects of it seem to connect to Foucault, Derrida, and, quite possibly, Richards.  Bakhtin’s notion of “individual concrete utterances” being formed by “participants in the various areas of human activity” seems to connect somewhat to Foucault.  Foucault’s notion of discourse as being inherently related to power within the various discourses would appear to link to this notion.  Thus, these utterances would be significantly influenced by power and the will to truth in various discourses and, perhaps, become “relatively stable types” as a result.  

The theories of Derrida, especially his chain of signification, would reflect the concept of the three aspects being “inseparably linked to the whole of the utterance.”  Essentially, Derrida rejected the notion that individual signifiers each had a concrete and specific signified.  For Derrida, the signifier was always modified by the signifiers and the respected signifieds they generated in the mind of the listener.  The context of the entire linguistic phrase was always contingent on the context and the words surrounding each individual signifier.  Meaning could not be made in isolation.

Both of these discussions seem to relate to Richards as well.  Richards, as we know, thrived on context and ambiguity.  Obviously, the work of Bakhtin is highly reliant on context and, because of this, would seem to result in ambiguity.  However, the concept of speech genres, those “relatively stable types,” would possibly explain how we are able to lessen ambiguity in our communication.  These speech genres lessen the possibility for ambiguity since, if we are familiar with the speech genre and the discourse(s) it is a part of, we can most likely begin to find some stability in meaning through those “relatively stable types.”

Although it is difficult to directly attribute the work of Bakhtin to other rhetoricians, commonalities can still be demonstrated that at least suggest a possible influence.  Even if these rhetoricians were not directly aware of Bakhtin, his work did have correlations with their own.  They might not have necessarily been antecedents who directly relied on the work of Bakhtin, yet it appears apparent that even if they were not antecedents they were at least contemporaries, grappling with the same issues even if they never came into contact with Bakhtin’s theories.

Jeff:

While reading Bakhtin, I noticed a lot of connections with the authors that we’ve read earlier in class. I saw connections between Bakhtin and Burke, Richards, Foucault, and even Gates. Though I’m not sure some of these theorists would be considered historical antecedents to Bakhtin, they are certainly antecedents in my understanding of rhetorical theory.

I think that theorist most like Bakhtin would have to be Burke. In the excerpt from Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, I could see similarities to Burke’s terministic screen, his theory of identification, and of course his interest in ambiguity. In Language as Symbolic action, Burke asserts that “any given terminiology is a reflection of reality” (1341). This is similar to Bakhtin’s assertion that “a sign does not simply exist as part of reality--it reflects and refracts another reality” (1211). Though both theorists are discussing the interpretation of signs, Bakhtin seems to also be discussing the use of signs. Bakhtin’s discussion of “verbal interaction” and his metaphor of the “bridge” shared by the addresser and addressee, seemed very similar to Burke’s idea of identification. Bakhtin says that the addressor assumes that the “addressee [is] a contemporary of our literature, our science, our moral and legal codes” (1215), in essence, that they would identify with us. Finally, Bakhtin, like Burke, is very interested in ambiguity’s role in making meaning. For Bakhtin, meaning is made in the ambiguous intersection of a listener’s active interpretation of the speaker.

Bakhtin also shared a lot of similarities with Richards, though it seemed as though Bakhtin had more of a macroscopic view than Richards. Bakhtin, like Richards, believes that words are inherently neutral, and are “a two-sided act”(1215) between speaker and interpreter; meaning, they argue, is made not by the words themselves, but in their interpretation. Unlike Richards though, Bakhtin believes that words can and often do become imbued with meaning through past utterances, and then are used in new utterances where the meaning is reinforced. Bakhtin also gave room for words to be utterances on their own, which I don’t think Richards accounted for at all. This neutrality gives way for words’ meanings to change over time, which Richards, I think, would agree with.

Though my understanding of Foucault is quite elementary, I think his and Bakhtin’s theories share some similarity; mainly in regards to the idea that language is informed by ideology. I think that Foucault’s belief is certainly more hardline, in that language could not exist without ideology and power, but I think that Bakhtin believes that although language could exist without ideology, it would be meaningless. Nothing more than the animalistic noises.

Although this connection is quite superficial, I think that Bakhtin’s discussion of the “two-way act” (1215) of words and that “an utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances” (1233), shares some similarities with Gates’ theory of “Signifyin’.” Though different from “Signifyin’,” I think that Bakhtin’s idea that the listener takes what was said and reshapes it, and that an utterance is imbued with meaning from all utterances before and after it work very well with Gates’ ideas.

A Dialogue (of sorts):

J:  Let's get started...

B:  sounds like a plan

So, I totally missed Burke in my discussion--why do you think he merges with Bakhtin so well?

J:  Initially, I was struck by the fact that Bakhtin used the words "reflects" and "reality"

Which, as I'm sure you remember, is really similar to what Burke says when he's talking about Terministic Screens.

I think noticing that connection caused me to look through the "screen" of how Burke and Bakhtin connected

Not just in terms of the terministic screen, but I noticed a connection between Bakhtin's "two-way act" of the word, and Burke's identification. And of course, their love of ambiguity...

I liked your connection between Bakhtin and Derrida. I'm not very familiar with Derrida, outside of deconstruction.

J:  Can you expand more on Derrida's connection to Bakhtin?

B:  You might have been fortunate missing out on Derrida so far (hehehehe).  Anways, Derrida pushed back at Saussure's notion of every signifier having a concrete and specific signfied (the mental representation created in the mind).  For Derrida (at least to the best of my understanding), this signified relied heavily on context--thus dog in two separate conversations might create drastically different signifieds.  For example, if I said dog in relation to dog fighting, you might begin to imagine a pit bull; however, I say Paris Hilton, you most likely see a chihuahua.  The signfied was always contingent on the entire "chain of signfication."  Hence, this chain for me resembled Bahktin's idea of the utterance, especially how the utterance needed to be taken as a whole to make meaning.  This contextualization also made me think of Richards--it seemed like "speech genres" might explain how we can communicate effectively in spite of the inherent ambiguities of language.  Thoughts?

J:  I can definitely see the Bakhtin/Derrida connection; I think Bakhtin even used the chain of signification metaphor. I wonder if that was as a result of his translator, or if he actually used it.

I also noticed a connection to Richards, but I think it's interesting that we both talked about too similar, but different, aspects of Richards.

J:  You focused on the "speech genres," and how they contribute to meaning making, while I focused on the utterance bringing meaning to the neutral word.

But I do think you're on to something with the speech genres contributing to us to make meaning with ambiguities.

As an aside, I really liked Bakhtin's assertion that a socially awkward person isn't actually socially awkward, he just doesn't understand genres that well.

B:  Yeah, that resonated with me as well.  I think of that constantly when in social situations.  It's funny how we all have certain blind spots.  For me, I know if I'm around wine and cheese people, I'm entirely socially awkward.  I never developed an affinity for these types of gatherings, so I never know how to enter myself into the conversation to contribute and, half the time, I'm confused as to what people saying because different terms seem to have context specific meanings.  However, I can talk art all day--these two would seem to be mutually learned, so I'm not sure why I feel comfortable in one genre as opposed to another.  What genres do you feel you do not have aptitude in?

J:  I am unable to participate in the genre of sports conversations. I know most of the rules, and teams, and basic things, but I don't watch sports at all, so I can't participate in any discussions related to current players, or controversies, or things like that. It puts me at a real disadvantage in elevator conversations, and especially during the sports category at trivia.

I think I might fall into your classification of "wine and cheese" people though-- well, maybe more of a beer and cheese person.

B: Alas, we can't be experts at everything.  I wonder how knowledge of one speech genre might help in others.  Do you think we make connections between varying speech genres, and perhaps that causes much ambiguity?

J:  I think our knowledge of varying genres can definitely cause us to import ambiguity into new genres.

I think it's especially evident when we're teaching our freshman, haha.

B:  I wonder if Dr. Yancey feels the same way...

Bakhtin in Dialogue, with Richards, Weaver, Burke, Foucault...

Aimee's Bakhtin

	Richards	Weaver	Burke	Foucault
Bakhtin (Similarities)	Language as a sign system	Rhetorical intention in every use of speech. Motivations in every utterance.	Interested in motivations and human interactions involved in rhetoric	Knowledge is made through discourse
Bakhtin (Differences)	Words are not neutral. Interpretation is internal.	Words are not neutral. Ethics is the central concern of rhetoric.	There are inevitable ambiguities and inconsistencies among motives.	Focuses on Power relationships

For Bakhtin, rhetoric expands to every act of speech or writing. Language is made up of utterances (oral and written words and sentences) that reflect the specific conditions and goals of various areas of human activity (1227). A sentence on its own is not a unit of speech communication because it is “not demarcated on either side by a change of speaking subjects; it has neither direct contact with reality nor a direct relation to other utterances; and it has no capacity to determine directly the responsive position of the other speaker, that is, it cannot revoke a response” (1236). The utterance, therefore, is a finalized, whole mode of communication that invites a dialogic response. Thematic content, style, and compositional structure are linked to the whole of the utterance (1227). Each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of utterances, which Bakhtin terms speech genres (1227). Most speech genres do not allow the reflection of the individual speaker’s style. The most conducive genres for individual style are those of artistic literature. Bakhtin’s view on language would differ from Foucault who focuses on statements, not utterances, and how relationships communicated in statements allow for meaning to be made, but also allow for a certain level of ambiguity that allows for multiple possibilities of reality. Foucault also focuses on the relationships of power and communication in discourse, which controls knowledge. Bakhtin does not address power relationship and instead discusses the relationship between speaker, listener, and context in a pretty balanced way.

Like Aristotle, Bakhtin is concerned with the relationship between the speaker and the audience, but differs in his views of this relationship. Bakhtin says that the relationship of active speaker and passive listener is a fiction that produces “a completely distorted idea of the complex and multifaceted process of active speech communication” (1232).  Instead when the listener perceives and understands the meaning of speech, the listener becomes an active participant throughout the duration of the utterance. There is a dialogical method involved between the speaker’s or writer’s rhetorical intentions and the audiences active role in interpreting and responding to the speaker or writer. Bakhtin seems to align closely with Burke in regards to the interaction involved in rhetoric. In both cases, the scholars look at the motivations of the speakers and how audiences respond to these motivations.

In regards to language, Bakhtin argues that it is not a stable system, but instead a “continuous generative process implemented in the social-verbal interaction of speakers” (1223). Words do not have inherent meaning because a word is “the product of a reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee” (1215). This idea seems to agree with Richards’s thoughts on the meaning of words as sign systems. Richards says that words mean nothing by themselves, and “it is only when a thinker makes use of them that they stand for anything, or, in one sense, have ‘meaning’” (1274). However, Bakhtin says that words are neutral in that they don’t express a specific ideological function. Instead they can carry out any ideological function—scientific, aesthetic, ethical, religious (1213). According to Bakhtin, “the neutral meaning of the word applied to a particular reality under particular real conditions of speech communication creates a spark of expression” (1243). Whereas Richards and Weaver argue that words are not neutral. Weaver says, “Language is a system of imputation, by which values and precepts are first framed in the mind and are then imputed on things” (1359). Richards says words do not have literal meanings, but meaning is shaped through the contexts in which language has been used. Bahktin views words as social signs, that are part of a material reality imbued with ideological meaning by their use in social situations; whereas, Richards and Weaver appear to view meaning making as an internal, individualized mental process.

Jie’s Bakhtin

There are many interesting things we can talk about Bakhtin. Just take a look at the list of his key terms: ideology, dialogue, consciousness, utterance, sentence, word, meaning, theme, inner speech, speech genres, actively responsive understanding… and they are connected with each other in different ways. Bakhtin’s theory is so rich and complex that it is not enough to discuss his rhetoric and compare him with other theorists in one short paper. Here I just want to concentrate on one important contribution Bakhtin makes to the study of rhetoric: redefining language.

Bakhtin’s understanding of language seems complicated. He finds it unsatisfying to simply treat language as an abstract system of signs. Unlike some linguists, Bakhtin does not believe that language consists of words and sentences with fixed, stable meanings. That is a system related to grammar and dictionary, reflecting a mechanic understand of language. However, it seems that he does not simply deny the value of a system of signs, as he takes care to distinguish utterance from sentence and meaning from theme. Moreover, in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, he uses the concept of sign to show the ubiquity of ideologies, claiming that “The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with one another” (1211). In fact, Language is full of ideologies. Bakhtin states that “The linguistic form and its ideological impletion are not severable” while “Each and every word is ideological and each and every application of language involves ideological change” (1220). Because language is immersed in different values and ideas, each form of speaking or writing can be rhetorical. Here we can see something similar to Weaver’s and Burke’s theory. Both of them realize that language is not neutral. Weaver believes that “Every use of speech, oral and written, exhibits an attitude, and an attitude implies an act” and language is “subjectively born, intimate, and value-laden vehicle” (1359). Burke points out that terminologies serve as “terministic screens” (1341), directing people’s attention to certain things. However, both of them also understand language differently. Weaver’s rhetoric is based on “intellectual love of the Good” (1371) as he believes in absolute truth and “ultimate good” (1368). Accordingly, language is “sermonic” (1359), and he supports a hierarchy of words: “All of the terms in a rhetorical vocabulary are like links in a chain stretching up to some master link which transmits its influence down through the linkages” (1370). While Bakhtin believes that themes of utterances come from social interaction and social situation, Weaver thinks that ideas and thoughts rise from individuals’ inside by seeing language as “a system of imputation, by which values and precepts are first framed in the mind and are then imputed to things” (1359). Burke is different in that he views language as symbolic action, and while Bakhtin places language in reality against treating language as an abstract system, Burke questions the existence of reality: “how fantastically much of our ‘Reality’ could not exist for us, were it not for our profound and inveterate involvement in symbol systems” (1342). In other words, when terminologies lead to “a selection of reality” (1341), in a certain sense a significant part of reality may be even a product of symbol systems.

Bakhtin’s rhetoric, on the other hand, is based on the social nature of language. He first rediscovers the alive, actual, concrete language used in reality. “Language acquires life and historically evolves precisely here, in concrete verbal communication, and not in the abstract linguistic system of language forms, not in the individual psych of speakers.” (1222) Consequently he emphasizes the functional utterance and theme instead of word and meaning, which belongs to the abstract system of language. More importantly, this focus on verbal communication (dialogue) reveals the social aspect of language. In Bakhtin’s view, speakers or writers can never be individuals staying outside the society. The so-called individual style is always shaped and determined by speech genres, relatively stable types of utterances, while individual speeches are born in particular social situations by individuals with certain social orientations. Studying actual, concrete language, Bakhtin also highlights the audience (addressee). In reality, the addressee is never a passive being that can be ignored, and “Any true understanding is dialogic in nature” (1226). Understanding is always active, responsive, and language is a generative process. To a certain extent, Bakhtin’s awareness of social nature of language and social situations generating verbal communication is similar to Foucault’s rhetoric. However, while Bakhtin still sees individuals in society and discusses speakers/writers or audience, it seems that Foucault takes a step further and concentrates on social conditions, relations, and positions constraining communication. In Foucault’s theory, individuals disappear while functions emerge. He makes it clear that the discourse he examines is not about “the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined” (1444). He is more interested in the position of subject and the function of author than individuals. Besides, though Richards is also concerned about language, signs, and communication, he is radically different from Bakhtin in that he tends to treat language as an abstract system of signs and ignores its social nature. In his triangle of symbol, thought (reference), and thing (referent), though he also implies that language is value-laden (thoughts between language (symbol system) and reality (things)), what Baktin values, including the active role of audience and speech genres that are derived from social situation and shape speeches, is nowhere to find. Believing that rhetoric can also be exposition, Richards sticks to “the strict scientific or ‘rigid’ end of this scale of dependent variabilities” (1289). Although he also talks about contexts and the interinanimation of words (the meaning of a particular word depends on special situations and other words), because he works on a different system of language, his understanding of context, word, meaning is essentially different from Bakhtin’s.