Context and Instability: The Contributions of I. A. Richards

Although I see certain similarities between I. A. Richards and those who came before him, I found him to be, for the most part, markedly different.  In my estimation, his resemblances to the ancients and others who came directly before him are only superficial, even if, on the surface, this does not appear to be so.  However, before I deal with these paradoxes, I think it is important to address what I. A. Richards established that differentiated him from those who came before him since I believe these theories in many ways negate the possible similarities between him and the ancients.

Context was crucial for I. A. Richards; while other rhetoricians have discussed it before him, Richards contribution is vital since he deemed language to be completely contingent on context.  For Richards, "Words, as every one now knows, 'mean' nothing by themselves, although the belief that they did, as we shall see in the next chapter, was once equally universal.  It is only when a thinker makes use of them that they stand for anything, or, in one sense, have 'meaning'" (1274).  Richards was moving against traditional linguistic theory that had deemed the signified (the mental representation of a sign) to be universal.  For Richards, this was impossible, as the meaning ascribed to words in his philosophies was forever changing, completely contingent on the context (albeit it seems more the immediate context in Richards eyes, but I digress).  Hence, Richards rejected the notion that ambiguity was "...a fault in language..." that could be eliminated and instead contended that "...it is an inevitable consequence of the powers of language..." (1287).

However, returning to my previous digression, I get a sense that in some ways Richards viewed that meaning resided in the immediate context.  I tread lightly here as my understanding may be incomplete--"If so the fault will not lie, I hope and believe, either in my stupidity or in our joint stupidity.  It will lie in the abstractness of the language" (1282).  While I do not believe Richards thought we could arrive at a finite meaning from the immediate context, I did get the impression that he thought that meaning could, in some ways, be systematically studied within relation to the immediate context.  He concedes that, "This theorem alleges that meanings, from the very beginning, have a primordial generality and abstractness..." (1283).  Yet, he also begins his lecture by noting "...that there is room for a persistent, systematic, detailed inquiry into how words work..." which needed to be "philosophic" (1281). 

This is why, in my estimation, Richards appears to "bridge the gap" between the ancients and some his contemporaries and postmodernity--he identifies the ambiguity of language that is critical to postmodern theories yet still appears to hold a belief that it can be systematically studied, even if such a study is by nature philosophic and incomplete.  But, his discussions of sensation and perception seem to contradict this in a way:

"A sensation would be something that just was so, on its own, a datum; as such we have none.  Instead we have perceptions, response whose character comes from the past as well as the present occasion.  A perception is never just of an it; perception takes whatever it perceives as a thing of a certain sort.  All thinking from the lowest to the highest--whatever else it may be--is sorting." (1283)

Here is where I really wrestled with Richards ideas.  If all thinking is sorting based off of our perceptions, the immediate context that words are reliant on for meaning would appear to shift from individual to individual, unless we assume a universal human perception or that everyone sorts in similar ways.  Not being willing to make these assumptions, yet agreeing with Richards overall premise, I would have to contend that the immediate context is not as crucial as Richards believes; even within the immediate context, varying perceptions and lines of thought among individuals would seem to necessitate that words would "mean" in different ways for different individuals.  Thus, meaning is even further ambiguous as it is reliant on the individual.  But, as a necessary caveat, I must note that I'm not sure whether Richards may have arrived at this conclusion or not.  I sensed an oscillation in these texts.

Thus, I conclude with an open-ended question to my classmates:  Is Richards closer on a theoretical continuum to the ancients and his contemporaries or does his thinking more or less reflect (and perhaps possibly inspired) the postmodern thinkers that came after him? 

I. A. Richards

                                                                                                  How is Richards like and unlike those who came before him, especially the ancients?

Brittney and Jeff's take on Ramus and Astell: Contributing by Taking Away

In dealing with the question of what did Ramus and Astell contribute to rhetoric, we think that it’s more appropriate to consider what they took away from rhetoric—at least as far as the classicists were concerned. In their definitions, the only concerns of rhetoric are style and delivery; the other three canons (invention, arrangement, and memory) belong to dialectic. Regarding invention, Ramus believes there are only ten topics necessary. He claims that these topics fulfill all that is needed to explain the theory of all reasoning and all arguments.  In terms of arrangement, he believes such arguments should be structured through syllogisms (general to specific). Astell spends less time on logic, attributing reason to innate ability. In this sense, both rhetors spend time telling us that reason and logic are innate or natural skills, and that students only need help developing and growing that skill.

For this reason, they also devalue the emphasis on reading classical texts. Ramus plainly states that reading the works of our classical forefathers is useless, and considers the time he spent reading them a waste. Astell, doesn’t take the same hardline approach that Ramus does, but she thinks that there’s no need for extensive classical learning; instead, she thinks that women can learn enough from reading “good books.” 

Astell, unlike Ramus, agrees with Quintilian that a good rhetor is a virtuous and just person speaking well. She thinks that rhetoric is inherently tied to Christian ideals, which necessitates a virtuous speaker. It’s clear that her goal is to help women learn how to speak better in conversational settings, but also to better their ability to teach children, which she believes is a virtuous act, and her duty as a Christian. Ramus, on the other hand, believes that virtuousness is not a part of the five canons, and thus has no place in rhetoric. He thinks that virtuousness is the subject of moral philosophy, and to include the discussion of virtuous qualities in rhetoric is superfluous and makes the art of rhetoric defective. 

Ramus believes that reason and logic are the most important means of persuasion. Astell also considers reason and logic to be important, but she gives a lot of weight to appealing to one’s audience, specifically through establishing ethos. She suggests that discussing one’s anglican values and practicing them, which will be shared with the audience, is a great tool in persuasion. We believe that this difference is based in the different idea of where a rhetor should be practicing their craft. Ramus, like his predecessors, considers the rhetor’s arena as the public sphere; while Astell directs her rhetors to focus on more private, conversational situations. 

Although they agree that style and delivery are firmly in the domain of rhetoric, they have differing opinions on the characteristics of those canons. Ramus spends time instructing his readers on the necessity of figures and tropes, and bringing in some poetic and pleasing language into your speaking. Astell, on the other hand, is more concerned with the clearness of your message, and advises that you should avoid unusual and/or pretentious words in favor of ones that are easier for your audience to understand. In terms of delivery, Astell believes that women are naturally better at delivering a message than men are, because their voices are more tonally “pleasing and better suited to the mostly private occasions” where they’ll be practicing their craft (845). 

The Times They Are A-Changin’: Ramus and Astell and the Early Modern Shifts in Rhetorical Theory and Practice (from Josh and Janelle)

In the 100 years between 1440 and 1540, European explorers from many nations struck land in places previously unknown to the Western World. With sea-faring pioneers exploring Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, South America, India and Southeast Asia, China and Japan, Canada and Greenland, contact with new cultures created spaces for discourse. Not only in the realm of exploration, but other social changes seemed, at this time, to provide new ways of thinking about the world and new rhetorics to discuss those changes—the movable type printing press designed by Gutenberg in 1439; the protestant reformation in 1517; the fall of feudalism; and the rise of the European mercantile middle class among others. Lloyd Bitzer invites us to regard rhetorical situation as “a natural…context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance.” The major historical moves being made at this time certainly provide the exigencies for the rise of rhetoricians like Mary Astell and Peter Ramus.

Astell’s and Ramus’ politics help us to understand the changes in rhetoric at this time. Primary among these is the shift in how rhetoric is positioned in the academy. For Ramus, rhetoric was no longer privileged as it was in the classical era, as part of the trivium. Instead, the art of rhetoric was divorced from logic and thought of only as related to style (and, in part, delivery). As such, rhetoric was considered a less serious educational enterprise, and new science grew into favor as it was perceived to be free of critical disposition and to be more universal (not culturally bound). Ramus sees a shift from rhetorical invention (interpretation) to empirical research that coincided with the rise of modern science and the rise of bourgeoisie and capitalism.

Although this shift is generally seen as a detriment to rhetoric, it did open the space of rhetoric to new voices.  Astell and Ramus both focus on the need for rhetoric to be employed through vernacular language, which allowed for people who did not have a classical education to still be rhetoricians. Unlike Ramus, Astell preferred natural eloquence over artificial eloquence, conceiving “an artificial and rhetorical stile compos’d of false thoughts, hyperbole, and forc’d figures…the greatest fault in rhetoric” (852). Astell believed that people were only responsible to God for accounting how they lived their lives, and, so as to act well, women should be allowed to work in limited spheres. Astell overcomes gendered barriers just as Ramus addressed those related to class.  

Astell and Ramus both break from traditional rhetorical tradition in the areas previously stated but also, notably, in their shift from rhetoric as a vocalized art to primarily written text. No doubt, such a shift is owes itself to the invention of the printing press and the wider distribution of printed materials. Compositions, then, understanding their production in this written format, are transformed in structure and style. The printing press also creates a change in pedagogical practices, especially in the role of and access to education, that make the popularity of Ramus and Astell possible.

Now, although Ramus and Astell both break away from the classical tradition of rhetorical theory, they should not be thought of as representing the same break. That they do so in different ways and for widely different reasons is just as interesting as the fact that they did it all. A brief examination of what they kept and what they rejected will help us to appreciate the unique intellectual moves they took to signal their break from the dominance of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

It is interesting that although Ramus roundly rejects Quintilian and harshly criticizes Aristotle, he remains a contentious admirer of Cicero. I say contentious because although he expresses admiration for Cicero’s style, he rejects the theoretical underpinnings of Ciceronian rhetoric. He goes so far to say, in fact, that “not because of his mixed-up rules but because of our own rules, which we make conform to his achievements” (690). This statement has some important implications for both the theory and the practice of rhetoric. It suggests, first, that one can achieve good style and delivery even if one preaches bad theory (or perhaps even no theory) and two, that one’s practice might substantially differ from one’s theory in unconscious ways. If Ramus is correct, then all of Cicero’s success can be attributed to a mixture of luck and natural talent.

Astell, meanwhile, preserves one of the very things that Ramus sought to discredit in Quintilian while criticizing the aspect of Cicero that Ramus sought to preserve. Astell is very concerned with preserving Christian morality, going so far as to warn against “dressing up Error and Impertinence in a quaint and talking garb” (852). That is, Quintilian’s “good man speaking well” seems to prevail for her over style, the aspect of Cicero that Ramus so admired. And Ramus, of course, totally disavows the “good man speaking well” definition - so much that he says that even though bad people can and often do employ rhetoric to their advantage, it should not be a concern because it lies outside the purview of rhetoric (685). We see, then, that Ramus preserves one of the very things Astell rejects, and Astell rejects one of the things that Ramus preserves. Though they signal a break from the classical tradition, it is not a clean break but more of a fracture, perhaps a foreshadowing of the many different priorities rhetorical theorists would come to hold.

Logan, Heather, & Katie's take on Ramus and Astell

The exigence of Ramus’ text is what he perceives to be a major theoretical misunderstanding by Quintilian -- and thus of Cicero and Aristotle -- concerning the nature and position of invention. Specifically, he believes the Quintilian has conflated the making of knowledge, which for Ramus is the realm dialectic and invention, and the organization/arrangement/presentation of that knowledge: “I repeat, he [Quintilian] does not understand that invention is a process which supplies arguments, whereas arrangement is a different process which organizes arguments” (694). Throughout the text, he makes two provocative claims about the study of rhetoric: 1) Ramus believes the syllogism to be the most effective means of conveying logic and reason and faults Quintilian’s text where he sees them absent. He employs several throughout his text as a way of displaying their effectiveness; 2) to study rhetoric is to study the methods of persuasion.
    
The culmination of these arguments is that Ramus uses his text to bifurcate rhetoric and dialectic/ eloquence and invention. He claims, “therefore there are only two parts to rhetoric, style and delivery” (685). According to Ramus, “rhetoric should demonstrate the embellishment of speech first in tropes and figures, second in dignified delivery” (684). Inevitably, this privileges dialectic over rhetoric and assumes that dialectic can happen without the employment of rhetoric, both of which are problematic in contemporary conceptions of rhetoric. Additionally, he conflates terms like art, practice, and method: “like any other discipline, the theory of invention and arrangement must be practiced in two ways: first, in order that by its means we should through external examples learn common sense from argument, judgment from the manner of conclusion, and complete prudence from the method of arrangement and order; secondly, that by means of the same art we should devise similar examples in reading and writing” (696).
  
However, while Ramus is sometimes treated as the “bad guy” of rhetoric for this split, it does accomplish one interesting goal: by separating dialectic from rhetoric, Ramus establishes a need to study rhetoric (even though he positions it only as the study of effective delivery or style). The two intellectual activities require different skills, theories, and practices, and must be studied in different ways. Also, Ramus seems greatly connected to Plato’s understanding of rhetoric as language moving the will or the soul, because of the ways in which he establishes rhetoric as the movement of the will or the bringing to knowledge. In this framework, the rhetor must have a methodical way of understanding and catering to certain audiences. This closely links him to the classical tradition from which he attempts to distance himself.    

In sum, Ramus makes the claim that what Aristotle divides into sections of rhetoric is, in reality, a farce, as what he is dividing happens to be not rhetoric itself as an art but rather the conversation of rhetoric and dialectic, which Ramus points out as two different concepts. Dialectic and rhetoric do work together, Ramus points out, but rather it is the training in ethics that would be necessary in learning about emotions and stirring emotions as an orator. The question that arises out of Ramus’ argument is how emotions do play into rhetoric, or if they do only through ethics and not dialectic. While he makes a case in point for dividing dialectic and rhetoric, he leaves out the place of pathos.

Additionally, Ramus points to the fact that Aristotle questions scientific evidence and says that it is not an argument, and that science is not part of rhetoric, which Ramus dismisses and explains is part of dialectic, in which science has more of a firm ground. Thus, by saying this Ramus is discrediting Aristotle and saying that science and scientific proof is very much part of rhetoric because dialectic bonds with rhetoric, and thus if dialectic refers also to scientific proof, scientific proof would be part of rhetoric as well. This begs the question of how Ramus explains his earlier statement, then, of defining rhetoric an art and yet, in play with dialectic, becomes not invention, which he states is dialectic, but in fact scientific proof.  

Conversely, Astell makes a strong case for morality, virtue, and ethics in rhetoric, although both Ramus and Astell seem to agree that rhetoric can be used for good or ill needs, unlike their more optimistic forefathers.
Early in this selection, Astell puts forward a somewhat radical call to action for women, inviting them into more public services. Although Astell still ascribes traditional feminine roles and values to her female audience, she also invokes a sense of empowerment. In a rather lengthy address she claims that her female audience is quite capable of making positive change in their own lives and their communities should they commit to making such a change. Moreover, she asserts that women have wasted time learning trivialities of life instead of important material. She contends that with some education about the nature of virtuousness women can be powerful allies for the church and society as conversational rhetors.

Astell defines rhetoric as the act of revealing a truth or removing obfuscations to allow another to see the truth. Through her exploration of women’s rhetoric, Astell demonstrates that rhetoric may serve different ends based not only on the needs of an audience, but on the position of the rhetor. Astell claims that women have a unique opportunity to use rhetoric to enlighten others to truth or to convert them to Christianity; a single woman, she writes, is mother to the world and is always capable of nurturing its citizens. Unlike men’s rhetoric, which is public and political, women’s rhetoric is more often exercised in conversation, charity, and religion in order to promote good, truth, and solidarity among women. This is a rhetoric that privileges simple and plain language, as Astell sees fanciful or complicated words as an attempt to trick and audience. Instead, Astell’s rhetoric involves heavy reliance on ethos and her own moral character as a “woman of God,” whose speech serves to represent a true and good reality. Importantly, Astell asserts that rhetoric is available or accessible to all people as all people are capable of reason and reasonable thought. She also asserts that writing and spoken rhetoric may follow the same styles and arrangements as she does not find them to be different arts, signaling the growing value of writing and its shrinking inferiority to speech making.   

Like Plato, Astell sees rhetoric as building on a true, obvious, and holy “good.” She strengthens the bond between rhetoric and religious practice, the soul, and spiritual enlightenment. However, Astell also provides a new nuance to early understandings of rhetorics by broadening the role of rhetor. In seeing women as rhetors, Astell opens a space for women to share stories and projects, perhaps laying the groundwork for girls’ schools and other civil service projects. Astell also seems to valorize traditionally feminine traits, such as tenderness, as they may have a benefit for the larger community and not just the family. Although Platonic principles of utility and holiness may still be in play, Astell’s work broadens the categories and softens some boundaries.  Too, Astell’s claim that rhetoric is available to all further broadens concepts of rhetor, audience, and purpose.

Faith, Canons, Truth, and Writing

Our reading of Ramus’s and Astell’s additions to rhetoric focuses on the Christian angle present in their work, their division of the canons, their definitions of rhetoric and dialectic as they pertain to truth and morality, and their discussion of writing and speech.

First, Ramus, a Protestant, attacks scholasticism—a uniquely Catholic phenomenon, exemplified by people like Thomas Aquinas, who loved Aristotle—and we discussed the possibility that his critique of Aristotle may have been partially attributable to Aristotle’s importance to the scholastics. Astell, an Anglican and a good English woman, is labeled in Bizzell and Herzberg’s introduction as “one of the first feminists” (846), but we find that even as she seeked to advance women’s “True and Greatest Interests,” she did so within confines of the patriarchal system of the Church without necessarily opposing them.

For Ramus, rhetoric is divided into two parts: Style (embellishment) and delivery. Ramus sees invention and arrangement as separate, assigning them instead to dialectic, which Ramus views as a tool for testing truth. According to Ramus, dialectic is “the mentor of speaking with truth and constancy” (683), and while his discussion of rhetoric separates it from moral philosophy, he still seems to see truth as a goal of good rhetoric. Similarly, Astell seems to align with Plato in her view that an orator’s goal should be to lead her audience to the Truth, rather than to outsmart them, best them, or trick them into changing opinions. She writes, “It is an abuse both of Reason and Address to press ‘em both into the Service of a Trifle or an Untruth; and a mistake to think that any Argument can be rightly made, or any Discourse truly Eloquent that does not illustrate and inforce Truth” (852). Furthermore, Astell extends rhetoric not only to women, but to the private sphere, and argues that women have the advantage over men in that their voices are more pleasing and better suited to private conversation.

We find a point of departure or contrast between Ramus and Astell in their discussion of the role of the morality or character of the orator. Ramus argues for the separation of the art of rhetoric from its materials, arguing that moral philosophy is not a part of rhetoric (685). In fact, he has a distinct problem with Quintilian’s “good man speaking well,” arguing that this view of an orator is “useless and stupid” (683), because “a definition of an any artist which covers more than is included in the rules of his art is superfluous and defective” (683). In contrast, Astell’s view of ethos seems at odds with Ramus’s separation of morality and rhetoric; to Astell, an orator must lead a Christian life and her audience must be able to detect her sincerity and piety. She writes that “it is to little purpose to Think well and speak well, unless we Live well” (858).

Another point of contrast between Ramus and Astell is in their treatment of the written and spoken word, and the utility of reading and studying. Reading Classical works (Aristotle, Cicero, Quitilian) is a waste of time to Ramus. He even goes so far as to lament that “I wish I had not known the wretchedness of wasting so much of my youth in this way” (681). While Ramus argues that “the same oration can expound purely, speak ornately, and express thought wisely” (684), he couches these points in a discussion of the separation of the art from the art’s materials. Astell, similarly, argues for clarity of speech and writing (between which she makes no distinction, a point at which she notably diverges from Aristotle), and calls obscurity “one of the greatest faults in Writing” and argues that it is “sometimes design’d, to conceal an erroneous opinion which an Author dares not openly own” (853).

Andrew and David

A Serious Conversation About Morality (and more..) (with Ji(o)e)

Joe:  So what’d you think of the readings: what do you think is the major point of Ramus? What do you think he contributes?

Jie: I think Ramus’s argument is somewhat simplified. He believes that his general principles and ten topics can cover everything—it is not really convincing to me. On the other hand, he emphasizes reasoning and syllogism to redefine dialectic and rhetoric. He believes rhetoric has little to do with moral philosophy, which is a part of dialectic.

Joe: Ok, so let’s talk about Ramus’ ideas about morality and ethics. One of the fundamental arguments that Ramus makes is the dialectic is involved with finding a true knowledge; it’s not necessary to find a true knowledge for rhetoric. 

Jie: Then how would you define true knowledge here? It seems that Plato, Aristotle, Astell all define true knowledge differently. Plato’s true knowledge is transcendent while Astell’s understanding of true knowledge is “Thinking conformably to the Nature of Things.”

Joe: Astell’s focus is on “nature” which I think is probably related to God—a Christian God. So, I think Astell speaks of true knowledge as found through the teachings of God.  Only through Christianity can moral and ethical truths be found. 

Jie: Yes, I agree with you. And Astell also emphasizes that knowledge is important for women to successfully persuade other people.

Joe: So is the “knowledge” you’re speaking about True Christian knowledge or the knowledge of the specific subject she’s speaking about?

Jie: I think her “knowledge” at least includes two parts. The most important part, as you mentions, is the knowledge about God, the nature of things. But she also talks about how to speak and write well. In order to do that, women have to increase their knowledge. One example she uses here is the education of children.

Joe: I think you raise another focus of Astell: where women fit in the art of rhetoric. Astell separates discourse into two spheres: the public and the private.  She finds that women have a major role in private life: including the education of children; every-day conversation; and just overall domestic life. She further mentions how single women have the ability to educate the community—she is involved with the moral compass of the community.

Jie: Another important thing is that she believes everyone is capable of reason – both men and women are equal in this sense.  This is liberating and democratic.

Joe: Ramus, also, makes a claim that the art of rhetoric should be made to be understood by every man—but not just understood, but could be practiced by anyone.

Jie: But does that include women?

Joe: I don’t know—he doesn’t seem to mention women which Astell probably would have a problem with.  Another thing that Astell would have issue is with Ramus’ belief that rhetoric does not need to involve itself with morals—rhetoric is a means to a rhetor’s end.  The end doesn’t necessarily need to be moral—as long as the end is met.  How would Astell respond to that do you think?

Jie: Astell’s rhetoric is related closely to Christianity and God. In her view, believing in God is a natural part of being a good orator. So there is a specific moral purpose behind her oration, that is, doing good and pleasing God. “the way to be good Orators is to be good Christians.”

Joe: Astell also mentions that Rhetoric does have a immoral potential: “an Artificial and Rhetorical Stile Comps’d of false Thoughts, Hyperboles and forc’d Figures which is the greatest fault in Rhetoric” So, I think—possibly—that Astell might agree with Ramus that rhetoric could be used for “evil,” but she says that the “design of Rhetoric is to remove those Prejudices that lie in the way of Truth to reduce the Passions to the Government of Reasons.” So, while rhetoric could be used for “evil,” she says that the most successful orators are the ones that are True Christians—with a moral purpose. I think you touched on this earlier.

Jie: I totally agree with that. And I think her rhetoric is also audience-oriented. She is very conscious of the audience. When you said her “design of Rhetoric is to remove those Prejudices that lie in the way of Truth,” it also includes correcting other people’s mistakes and helping others find the right path.  One thing interesting is that when she talks about style, she emphasizes creating a style that different audience can find things they need –- it is a challenging job.  An orator needs to know how to deal with different people, well educated and perhaps not well-educated, at the same time.

Joe: Yes, I think that she would agree with the saying “you can catch more bees with honey”—she says that True Christians—because of their natural morality—can empathize with people more than those who pretend to be moral. Because of this True Christians are more persuasive.  This is connected to the orator’s ethos: ethos is not simply credibility, but credibility through a moral way of life—exemplified through being Christian. Ethos is a way of life—an ethical life.

Jie: So in this sense Astell may disagree with Ramus, who attacks Quintilian’s statement that “the orator cannot be perfect unless he is a good man.”

Joe: Yes, I think so too!  It’s interesting to see how Astell and Ramus both contribute very different things, but Astell still seems to be (somewhat) influenced by Ramus. I wonder what I A Richards has to say.

The Changing Face of Rhetoric by Amy and Aimee

 

Ramus has a different definition of rhetoric than Aristotle or Plato. For Aristotle and Plato, invention, arrangement, and style are all part of rhetoric. Ramus defines rhetoric as style, making invention and arrangement the province of dialectic. Dialectic concerns reason, rhetoric concerns speech, and for Ramus they are two separate realms. Ramus argues that “rhetoric is defined as the art of speaking well, not about this or that, but about all subjects” (689). The word “art” is important. Ramus sees rhetoric as an art, not a virtue. One can use rhetoric to discuss moral virtue, but rhetoric is not to be confused as being the same as moral virtue. At first glance, defining rhetoric as an art having to do with style may sound like it limits rhetoric, but Ramus expands rhetoric. Aristotle limits rhetoric to the forensic, deliberative, and ceremonial. Plato limits rhetoric to the transcendent. Ramus says that rhetoric is speaking about anything. Astell also defines rhetoric as style. She believes in clear, simple style because if “we desire to be intelligible to everybody, our Expressions must be more plain and explicit than they needed to be if we write only for ourselves” (853). Good rhetoric concerns transcendent, divine truth, as Astell argues “the substance and Life are not there if Vertue and Truth are wanting” (858).  Anyone who tries to mislead or speak other than the truth will find that their style and eloquence fall short.

The idea of virtue has been important for our first four rhetoricians. Plato believes that good rhetoric can plant the seeds of virtue in another. Aristotle believes that the truth of one’s argument is the most important thing in rhetoric, above style and delivery. Ramus believes that virtue has nothing to do with rhetoric as the rhetor can be a good person or a bad person.  Rhetoric is not a moral virtue, but rather a “virtue of the mind and the intelligence” (685). Astell believes that Christianity is an aid to rhetoric since it induces charitable and proper attitudes towards one’s audience, helping the rhetor strive to get the audience to understand divine truth. It does not seek to humiliate or deceive and audience. In turn, it will teach and inspire others as “So much Knowledge therefore as it is necessary to engage and keep us firm in our Christian Course, to fit us to help others in theirs, to stir us up to pursue, and direct us in our endeavors after one of the brightest Crowns of Glory, does very well become us” (860).

Ramus and Astell make a clear move in the understanding of who can be a rhetor. Ramus and Astell dismiss limitations that were placed on rhetors, thus expanding the realm of who can deliver rhetoric. Previously, Plato had limited the role of rhetor to philosophers alone. Plato sees  rhetoric as the art of influencing the soul through words, and to influence the soul, the rhetor has to know the truth. The philosopher is the only one with access to transcendental truth and the only one capable of planting the seed in other individuals. Aristotle moves away from Plato by expanding the role of rhetor beyond philosopher and opening it up to anyone who is capable of reasoning in public speech using artistic and inartistic proofs. Ramus, however, explains that rhetoric can be practiced by anyone, even by “men of the utmost depravity” (685). Since Ramus sees rhetoric as an art and not a virtue, even immoral men are capable of possessing and delivering rhetoric. Astell likewise expands the limitations on those capable of producing rhetoric by opening it up to women. Astell argues that men and women are equal on an intellectual level, and can be educated as well as men. If a woman is given the opportunity to learn how to read and speak, they can become capable of practicing rhetoric. Like Plato, Astell sees rhetors as people who can influence the soul and bring audiences closer to understanding the truth.

As Ramus and Astell expand the limitations on who is allowed to practice rhetoric, they also open up the realm of where rhetoric can be practiced. Like Plato, Ramus does not think that rhetoric should be confined to courtrooms and political debates. His notion moves away from Aristotle’s beliefs that rhetoric should only be practiced in public speeches, particularly ceremonial, forensic, and deliberative speeches. Since Ramus thinks of rhetoric as an art that can be practiced by virtuous and non-virtuous men alike, rhetoric is not limited to the public sphere (courtrooms and political arenas). Astell likewise sees the space for rhetoric opening up because of her views on women as rhetors. Although Astell promotes women’s intellectual equality, she opposes the idea of women speaking at political debates or in the public sphere. Instead, Astell argues that women are best suited to practice rhetoric in private conversation, which she sees as different but not necessarily inferior to the public sphere. Astell explains that women are best suited for work in education and community charitable work, and therefore becoming proficient at the art of conversation would be most beneficial for women. Thus, the space for practicing rhetoric includes not only the public, but the private sphere as well.

    

Ramus and Astell by Jacob and Nora

We began by looking for the ways that Ramus and Astell define rhetoric and how those definitions either echoed or contradicted the rhetoricians who came before them.

Ramus challenges Cicero’s canons by drawing hard boundaries between rhetoric from the dialectic by naming rhetoric as dialectic’s subordinate.  Ramus argues that while the dialectic is concerned with reason, rhetoric is concerned only with speech.   Rhetoric is then categorized in two canons and not five: style and delivery.  Invention, arrangement, and memory pertain to the dialectic.  Astell, on the other hand, more or less defines rhetoric as speaking and writing (using language) in order to “remove prejudices that lie in the way of truth” (852).

While for Astell, rhetoric is designed to make language clear enough to reveal Truth, Ramus emphasizes clear speech for the sake of argument. Ramus is not necessarily concerned with conveying Truth or Morals.  For him, truth is situated in the domain of the dialectic.  One of the main features of Ramus’s discussion is disassociating rhetoric from morality. He does this by arguing that because Quintilian includes more in his definition of the rhetor than he does in his definition of rhetoric, his definition of a rhetor (good man speaking well) is defective (683-684). Morality, then, is no concern of rhetoric.  

Astell’s rhetoric has everything to do with morality. She argues that women need to stay away from vain pursuit such as gazing in mirrors, obsessing over appearance, and “gaming” (which we can only assume has to do with cards); instead, they should focus on reading and contemplation (849, 861).  Invention for Astell is therefore an important part of rhetoric, and comes in the form of devotions and pious ritual.

Both Astell and Ramus neglect the Aristotelian relationship between genre -- epidectic, forensic, and deliberative -- and occasion. Astell does mention specific occasions for when women use rhetoric but her occasions are different than Aristotle’s. Astell’s occasions are not concerned with types of speech, such as praising or blaming, policy making, or deciding the truth of past events.  She is instead interested more generally in occasions and settings. Astell’s rhetoric, a woman’s rhetoric, takes place in more vernacular settings: teaching children or conversing (not gossiping!) with neighbors.   

We also noticed that Ramus disregards categories of “artistic” vs. “inartistic” on the basis of Quintilian’s definitions.  While Quintilian places artistic proofs under the category of signs and arguments, Ramus insists that signs and arguments cannot be distinguished because both are defined as infallible as opposed to doubtful.  In doing so, he extinguishes categories of “artistic” and “inartistic” proofs.  Astell does not mention these proofs specifically, but she does distinguish between flawed human knowledge and perfect knowledge (True and Natural).  

Both Astell and Ramus emphasize simplicity as a constant characteristic of good rhetoric, while Plato and Aristotle describe style as contingent on a situation and its audience.  When it comes to their contributions to rhetoric, Astell attempted to incorporate speech and writing into her larger purpose, which was to advocate for women’s education.  In other words, she brings advocacy to the conversation.  Meanwhile, Ramus’s contribution centers on his disregarding the classics.  In doing so, he opens up rhetorical study to those lacking classical education.

Brutus and Travius (A Dialogue)

Brutus:  For I, Ramus adds much to the discussion in regard to rhetoric.  His criticisms of classical rhetoricians, such as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, have much merit.  For it is assumed in many of the ancients that the art of rhetoric belongs to the moral and virtuous man.  However, as he notes, “Moreover it is absurd to think that these things are moral virtues whose origins are from nature, as if vices instead of virtues did not rather have their origins in nature” (685).  Thus, I believe not only does Ramus view rhetoric as an amoral domain, but he also pushes back against the idea of a transcendent (or spiritual) truth.  What do you think on this matter, Travius?

Travius:  Lo, Brutus, I agree, for Ramus declares that since virtue and vice alike are natural to humans, rhetoric is an art “whose followers can still be men of the utmost moral depravity” (685). However, what make you of his declaration that dialectic is the source of “…truth and constancy…” (683)? Can rhetoric arrive at, or derive from, Truth?

Brutus:  Oh how I have pondered such questions, Travius, since the very day of my birth.  For what is Truth?  For Plato and Astell, it seems to come from some transcendent force that man must tap into and that the rhetor must know the truth before he or she can speak well.  Aristotle, however, in many ways appears to believe that truth is arrived at through reason, and that rhetoric is the domain of that which cannot be proven through reason.  Ramus, alas, I am not sure of where he believes Truth resides. 

Yet, alas I ponder whether Truth is not created through rhetoric.  Do we not have fundamental shifts in the moral zeitgeist across generations?  If Truth is transcendent, would not these moral beliefs hold constant?  Or, perhaps, do we create Truth through rhetoric and, thus, morality itself?  Privilege me with your thoughts on this matter, Travius.   

Travius:  Is Truth the creation of humankind, or is morality a gift from the gods? Brutus, why not ask me an easier question, such as that concerning the origin of poultry or the ovum of such? The maligned sophists and post- modernists have long believed in the epistemic nature of rhetoric, creating knowledge from experience, and thus many individual truths, located in many times and locales. What may be true in 2013 at the Academy of the city-state of Tallahassee may not have been the case before the arrival of the revered Yancicles. On the other side of this coin, Astell argues that rhetoric can only serve Truth, a gift from the almighty GOD: “It is an abuse both of Reason and Address to press ‘em into the service of a Trifle or an Untruth; and mistake to think that any Argument can be rightly made, or any Discourse truly Eloquent that does not illustrate and inforce Truth” (852).

Brutus:  GOD?  Travius, pray do you mean gods?  Bite your tongue lest the almighty Zeus strike us down.  Oh, while I do admire Astell, both Plato and she make a frightful error in my estimation.  They claim that the rhetor must know the Truth before he/she speaks it, yet how is a lowly human to divine the intentions of the gods?  It would be as if an ant tried to understand us.  Plato and Astell, regretfully, appear to assume a Truth that thus serves their rhetoric well.  Which leads me to ask—is this Truth the will of the gods or the will of humans?

Travius:  Brutus, we could belabor this query for hours upon days; let us hold that topic for another blog post. Let us move to Ramus’ claim that Aristotle’s canons of Invention, Arrangement, and Memory belong to that of dialectic, leaving only style and delivery to our beloved rhetoric.

Brutus:  Travius, it is only natural if one were to view truth as dear Ramus, and Astell, that Invention, Arrangement, and Memory would thoust belong there.  But, lo, if we believe that rhetoric creates Truth, then these things thus belong in its sphere.  While Ramus does question the moral nature of rhetoric, he does appear to believe in absolute Truth.  If it is so, then his hypothesis holds—if it is not, it crumbles as if under siege by the Persians.  Does thou believe Ramus to be too prescriptive, however?  He appears to prophesize a method for truth in categories of 10.

Travius:  I have read but little of Ramus’ 10, for he only mentions these categories in passing. I wish to know more of his rhetorical taxonomy. However, in ascribing arrangement to dialectic, Ramus argues that there is no room for creativity in organization. After raising contention with Quintillian’s claim that  there is no fixed art for arranging speeches, Ramus claims “…there is a fixed theory of syllogism and artistic method, common to everything which can be treated by order and reason” (695). Does not Astell also prescribe a certain manner of conduct?

Brutus:  She indeed does, yet I wonder how we shall classify her in relation to her contemporaries.  For she has done much for women it would appear, yet still believes their place to be underneath that of a man’s.  How do we consider her—in relation to her age and time or in comparison with those who speak now?

Travius: Yes, Brutus, for it seems Astell wishes women to eschew the habits of her time, such as spending hours in front of a looking glass, or attempting to snare a man in wedlock. Rather, the wise woman should read knowledgeable discourse and discern Truth from GOD. However, once she has divined Truth, she assumes a subservient status. She declares that “Women have no business with the Pulpit…” (856).

Brutus:  Alas, a rather sad declaration indeed.  Yet, we know this not to be true, since we must now venture to the Academy, where we will listen to one of the great rhetoricians of our time, Yancicles.  Her gift for oratory was certainly bequeathed to her by the gods!

Travius:  Or has she gained it through practice?  Let us go to agora at Williams and attempt to discern this truth.