Logan, Heather, & Katie's take on Ramus and Astell

The exigence of Ramus’ text is what he perceives to be a major theoretical misunderstanding by Quintilian -- and thus of Cicero and Aristotle -- concerning the nature and position of invention. Specifically, he believes the Quintilian has conflated the making of knowledge, which for Ramus is the realm dialectic and invention, and the organization/arrangement/presentation of that knowledge: “I repeat, he [Quintilian] does not understand that invention is a process which supplies arguments, whereas arrangement is a different process which organizes arguments” (694). Throughout the text, he makes two provocative claims about the study of rhetoric: 1) Ramus believes the syllogism to be the most effective means of conveying logic and reason and faults Quintilian’s text where he sees them absent. He employs several throughout his text as a way of displaying their effectiveness; 2) to study rhetoric is to study the methods of persuasion.
    
The culmination of these arguments is that Ramus uses his text to bifurcate rhetoric and dialectic/ eloquence and invention. He claims, “therefore there are only two parts to rhetoric, style and delivery” (685). According to Ramus, “rhetoric should demonstrate the embellishment of speech first in tropes and figures, second in dignified delivery” (684). Inevitably, this privileges dialectic over rhetoric and assumes that dialectic can happen without the employment of rhetoric, both of which are problematic in contemporary conceptions of rhetoric. Additionally, he conflates terms like art, practice, and method: “like any other discipline, the theory of invention and arrangement must be practiced in two ways: first, in order that by its means we should through external examples learn common sense from argument, judgment from the manner of conclusion, and complete prudence from the method of arrangement and order; secondly, that by means of the same art we should devise similar examples in reading and writing” (696).
  
However, while Ramus is sometimes treated as the “bad guy” of rhetoric for this split, it does accomplish one interesting goal: by separating dialectic from rhetoric, Ramus establishes a need to study rhetoric (even though he positions it only as the study of effective delivery or style). The two intellectual activities require different skills, theories, and practices, and must be studied in different ways. Also, Ramus seems greatly connected to Plato’s understanding of rhetoric as language moving the will or the soul, because of the ways in which he establishes rhetoric as the movement of the will or the bringing to knowledge. In this framework, the rhetor must have a methodical way of understanding and catering to certain audiences. This closely links him to the classical tradition from which he attempts to distance himself.    

In sum, Ramus makes the claim that what Aristotle divides into sections of rhetoric is, in reality, a farce, as what he is dividing happens to be not rhetoric itself as an art but rather the conversation of rhetoric and dialectic, which Ramus points out as two different concepts. Dialectic and rhetoric do work together, Ramus points out, but rather it is the training in ethics that would be necessary in learning about emotions and stirring emotions as an orator. The question that arises out of Ramus’ argument is how emotions do play into rhetoric, or if they do only through ethics and not dialectic. While he makes a case in point for dividing dialectic and rhetoric, he leaves out the place of pathos.

Additionally, Ramus points to the fact that Aristotle questions scientific evidence and says that it is not an argument, and that science is not part of rhetoric, which Ramus dismisses and explains is part of dialectic, in which science has more of a firm ground. Thus, by saying this Ramus is discrediting Aristotle and saying that science and scientific proof is very much part of rhetoric because dialectic bonds with rhetoric, and thus if dialectic refers also to scientific proof, scientific proof would be part of rhetoric as well. This begs the question of how Ramus explains his earlier statement, then, of defining rhetoric an art and yet, in play with dialectic, becomes not invention, which he states is dialectic, but in fact scientific proof.  

Conversely, Astell makes a strong case for morality, virtue, and ethics in rhetoric, although both Ramus and Astell seem to agree that rhetoric can be used for good or ill needs, unlike their more optimistic forefathers.
Early in this selection, Astell puts forward a somewhat radical call to action for women, inviting them into more public services. Although Astell still ascribes traditional feminine roles and values to her female audience, she also invokes a sense of empowerment. In a rather lengthy address she claims that her female audience is quite capable of making positive change in their own lives and their communities should they commit to making such a change. Moreover, she asserts that women have wasted time learning trivialities of life instead of important material. She contends that with some education about the nature of virtuousness women can be powerful allies for the church and society as conversational rhetors.

Astell defines rhetoric as the act of revealing a truth or removing obfuscations to allow another to see the truth. Through her exploration of women’s rhetoric, Astell demonstrates that rhetoric may serve different ends based not only on the needs of an audience, but on the position of the rhetor. Astell claims that women have a unique opportunity to use rhetoric to enlighten others to truth or to convert them to Christianity; a single woman, she writes, is mother to the world and is always capable of nurturing its citizens. Unlike men’s rhetoric, which is public and political, women’s rhetoric is more often exercised in conversation, charity, and religion in order to promote good, truth, and solidarity among women. This is a rhetoric that privileges simple and plain language, as Astell sees fanciful or complicated words as an attempt to trick and audience. Instead, Astell’s rhetoric involves heavy reliance on ethos and her own moral character as a “woman of God,” whose speech serves to represent a true and good reality. Importantly, Astell asserts that rhetoric is available or accessible to all people as all people are capable of reason and reasonable thought. She also asserts that writing and spoken rhetoric may follow the same styles and arrangements as she does not find them to be different arts, signaling the growing value of writing and its shrinking inferiority to speech making.   

Like Plato, Astell sees rhetoric as building on a true, obvious, and holy “good.” She strengthens the bond between rhetoric and religious practice, the soul, and spiritual enlightenment. However, Astell also provides a new nuance to early understandings of rhetorics by broadening the role of rhetor. In seeing women as rhetors, Astell opens a space for women to share stories and projects, perhaps laying the groundwork for girls’ schools and other civil service projects. Astell also seems to valorize traditionally feminine traits, such as tenderness, as they may have a benefit for the larger community and not just the family. Although Platonic principles of utility and holiness may still be in play, Astell’s work broadens the categories and softens some boundaries.  Too, Astell’s claim that rhetoric is available to all further broadens concepts of rhetor, audience, and purpose.