Ramus and Astell by Jacob and Nora

We began by looking for the ways that Ramus and Astell define rhetoric and how those definitions either echoed or contradicted the rhetoricians who came before them.

Ramus challenges Cicero’s canons by drawing hard boundaries between rhetoric from the dialectic by naming rhetoric as dialectic’s subordinate.  Ramus argues that while the dialectic is concerned with reason, rhetoric is concerned only with speech.   Rhetoric is then categorized in two canons and not five: style and delivery.  Invention, arrangement, and memory pertain to the dialectic.  Astell, on the other hand, more or less defines rhetoric as speaking and writing (using language) in order to “remove prejudices that lie in the way of truth” (852).

While for Astell, rhetoric is designed to make language clear enough to reveal Truth, Ramus emphasizes clear speech for the sake of argument. Ramus is not necessarily concerned with conveying Truth or Morals.  For him, truth is situated in the domain of the dialectic.  One of the main features of Ramus’s discussion is disassociating rhetoric from morality. He does this by arguing that because Quintilian includes more in his definition of the rhetor than he does in his definition of rhetoric, his definition of a rhetor (good man speaking well) is defective (683-684). Morality, then, is no concern of rhetoric.  

Astell’s rhetoric has everything to do with morality. She argues that women need to stay away from vain pursuit such as gazing in mirrors, obsessing over appearance, and “gaming” (which we can only assume has to do with cards); instead, they should focus on reading and contemplation (849, 861).  Invention for Astell is therefore an important part of rhetoric, and comes in the form of devotions and pious ritual.

Both Astell and Ramus neglect the Aristotelian relationship between genre -- epidectic, forensic, and deliberative -- and occasion. Astell does mention specific occasions for when women use rhetoric but her occasions are different than Aristotle’s. Astell’s occasions are not concerned with types of speech, such as praising or blaming, policy making, or deciding the truth of past events.  She is instead interested more generally in occasions and settings. Astell’s rhetoric, a woman’s rhetoric, takes place in more vernacular settings: teaching children or conversing (not gossiping!) with neighbors.   

We also noticed that Ramus disregards categories of “artistic” vs. “inartistic” on the basis of Quintilian’s definitions.  While Quintilian places artistic proofs under the category of signs and arguments, Ramus insists that signs and arguments cannot be distinguished because both are defined as infallible as opposed to doubtful.  In doing so, he extinguishes categories of “artistic” and “inartistic” proofs.  Astell does not mention these proofs specifically, but she does distinguish between flawed human knowledge and perfect knowledge (True and Natural).  

Both Astell and Ramus emphasize simplicity as a constant characteristic of good rhetoric, while Plato and Aristotle describe style as contingent on a situation and its audience.  When it comes to their contributions to rhetoric, Astell attempted to incorporate speech and writing into her larger purpose, which was to advocate for women’s education.  In other words, she brings advocacy to the conversation.  Meanwhile, Ramus’s contribution centers on his disregarding the classics.  In doing so, he opens up rhetorical study to those lacking classical education.