Sunday, March 24, 2013

Bakhtin and His Predecessors - Amy and Josh

We saw similarities between Bakhtin and his fellow postmodernists, Burke and
Foucault.  However, we decided to look at how Bakhtin compares to earlier
rhetoricians.  In order to explore historical antecedents, we looked at
Aristotle and Astell, but we also found that the connection between Bakhtin and
Richards was really important to include.

Aristotle deals with a limited number of genres – ceremonial, forensic, and deliberative.
Aristotle’s notion of genre is situated in the occasion for speaking.  Bakhtin expands on Aristotle’s notion of genre when he includes everyday genres of speech and writing with official discourse.  Bakhtin asserts that “any research whose material is concrete language…inevitably deals with concrete utterances (written and oral) belonging to various spheres of human activity and communication: chronicles, contracts, texts of laws, clerical and other documents, various literary, scientific, and commentarial genres, official and personal letter, rejoinders in everyday dialogue (in all of their diverse subcategories), and so on” (1229). In short, we thought of Aristotle as an antecedent to Bakhtin in the concept of genre, but we noted the ways in which Bakhtin takes Aristotle’s concept a few steps further.

Yet although they have similarities, we also noted their differences. Bakhtin does
not give his readers an instructional how-to manual for rhetoric, as Aristotle
does.  They also differ in how they view audience.  Aristotle’s idea
that “Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the
available means of persuasion” suggests a passive audience, an object who is
acted upon rather than acts.  For Bakhtin, “The fact is that when the
listener perceives and understands the meaning (the language meaning) of
speech, he simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it.”
(1232).  The audience, in Bakhtin’s view, has agency and responds to the speaker’s message.

Astell is a precursor to Bakhtin in that she discusses the importance of everyday
discourse.  She argues that women’s rhetoric should not be public, but
“Nature does for the most part furnish ‘em [women] with such a Musical Tone,
Perswasise Air and winning Address as renders their Discourse sufficiently agreeable
in Private Conversation” (856). Similarly, Bakhtin says that “Language is
realized in the form of individual concrete utterances (oral and written) by
participants in the various areas of human activity” (1227). The similarity lies in their inclusion of everyday, vernacular forms of interaction within the scope of rhetoric.  Neither Astell or Bakhtin limits rhetoric to public, official occasions.

Astell and Bakhtin do have their differences. Astell doesn’t differentiate between speech and writing, but Bakhtin does. Astell argues that “I have made no distinction in what has been said between speaking and writing, because tho they are talents, which do not always meet; yet there is no material difference between ‘em” (856).  Bakhtin draws a line between speech and writing.  He asserts, “The generic forms in which we cast our speech, of course, differ essentially from language forms.  The latter are stable and compulsory (normative) for the speaker, while generic forms are much more flexible, plastic, and free” (1239).  The genre of speech allows the speaker more creativity.

Finally, Bakhtin’s contemporary Richards also believes that discourse is social and
contextual.  They have similar notions of the relationship between signs
and objects.  The sign gives ideological meaning to the object.  Looking at discourse globally, Bakhtin argues, “Signs emerge, after all, only in the process of interaction between one individual consciousness and another.  And the individual consciousness itself is filled with signs.  Consciousness becomes consciousness only once it has been filled with ideological (semiotic) content, consequently, only in the process of social interaction” (1212).  Richards, while working at a microscopic, word-level of context, argues that “When we speak, the symbolism we employ is caused partly by the reference we are making and partly by social and psychological factors – the purpose for which we are making the reference, the proposed effect of our symbols on other persons, and our own attitude” (1274). Although their theories reveal a different scope of analysis, they both make provisions for the social dimensions of discourse - that discourse can only be understood as a socially situated act.

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