Brutus and Travius (A Dialogue)

Brutus:  For I, Ramus adds much to the discussion in regard to rhetoric.  His criticisms of classical rhetoricians, such as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, have much merit.  For it is assumed in many of the ancients that the art of rhetoric belongs to the moral and virtuous man.  However, as he notes, “Moreover it is absurd to think that these things are moral virtues whose origins are from nature, as if vices instead of virtues did not rather have their origins in nature” (685).  Thus, I believe not only does Ramus view rhetoric as an amoral domain, but he also pushes back against the idea of a transcendent (or spiritual) truth.  What do you think on this matter, Travius?

Travius:  Lo, Brutus, I agree, for Ramus declares that since virtue and vice alike are natural to humans, rhetoric is an art “whose followers can still be men of the utmost moral depravity” (685). However, what make you of his declaration that dialectic is the source of “…truth and constancy…” (683)? Can rhetoric arrive at, or derive from, Truth?

Brutus:  Oh how I have pondered such questions, Travius, since the very day of my birth.  For what is Truth?  For Plato and Astell, it seems to come from some transcendent force that man must tap into and that the rhetor must know the truth before he or she can speak well.  Aristotle, however, in many ways appears to believe that truth is arrived at through reason, and that rhetoric is the domain of that which cannot be proven through reason.  Ramus, alas, I am not sure of where he believes Truth resides. 

Yet, alas I ponder whether Truth is not created through rhetoric.  Do we not have fundamental shifts in the moral zeitgeist across generations?  If Truth is transcendent, would not these moral beliefs hold constant?  Or, perhaps, do we create Truth through rhetoric and, thus, morality itself?  Privilege me with your thoughts on this matter, Travius.   

Travius:  Is Truth the creation of humankind, or is morality a gift from the gods? Brutus, why not ask me an easier question, such as that concerning the origin of poultry or the ovum of such? The maligned sophists and post- modernists have long believed in the epistemic nature of rhetoric, creating knowledge from experience, and thus many individual truths, located in many times and locales. What may be true in 2013 at the Academy of the city-state of Tallahassee may not have been the case before the arrival of the revered Yancicles. On the other side of this coin, Astell argues that rhetoric can only serve Truth, a gift from the almighty GOD: “It is an abuse both of Reason and Address to press ‘em into the service of a Trifle or an Untruth; and mistake to think that any Argument can be rightly made, or any Discourse truly Eloquent that does not illustrate and inforce Truth” (852).

Brutus:  GOD?  Travius, pray do you mean gods?  Bite your tongue lest the almighty Zeus strike us down.  Oh, while I do admire Astell, both Plato and she make a frightful error in my estimation.  They claim that the rhetor must know the Truth before he/she speaks it, yet how is a lowly human to divine the intentions of the gods?  It would be as if an ant tried to understand us.  Plato and Astell, regretfully, appear to assume a Truth that thus serves their rhetoric well.  Which leads me to ask—is this Truth the will of the gods or the will of humans?

Travius:  Brutus, we could belabor this query for hours upon days; let us hold that topic for another blog post. Let us move to Ramus’ claim that Aristotle’s canons of Invention, Arrangement, and Memory belong to that of dialectic, leaving only style and delivery to our beloved rhetoric.

Brutus:  Travius, it is only natural if one were to view truth as dear Ramus, and Astell, that Invention, Arrangement, and Memory would thoust belong there.  But, lo, if we believe that rhetoric creates Truth, then these things thus belong in its sphere.  While Ramus does question the moral nature of rhetoric, he does appear to believe in absolute Truth.  If it is so, then his hypothesis holds—if it is not, it crumbles as if under siege by the Persians.  Does thou believe Ramus to be too prescriptive, however?  He appears to prophesize a method for truth in categories of 10.

Travius:  I have read but little of Ramus’ 10, for he only mentions these categories in passing. I wish to know more of his rhetorical taxonomy. However, in ascribing arrangement to dialectic, Ramus argues that there is no room for creativity in organization. After raising contention with Quintillian’s claim that  there is no fixed art for arranging speeches, Ramus claims “…there is a fixed theory of syllogism and artistic method, common to everything which can be treated by order and reason” (695). Does not Astell also prescribe a certain manner of conduct?

Brutus:  She indeed does, yet I wonder how we shall classify her in relation to her contemporaries.  For she has done much for women it would appear, yet still believes their place to be underneath that of a man’s.  How do we consider her—in relation to her age and time or in comparison with those who speak now?

Travius: Yes, Brutus, for it seems Astell wishes women to eschew the habits of her time, such as spending hours in front of a looking glass, or attempting to snare a man in wedlock. Rather, the wise woman should read knowledgeable discourse and discern Truth from GOD. However, once she has divined Truth, she assumes a subservient status. She declares that “Women have no business with the Pulpit…” (856).

Brutus:  Alas, a rather sad declaration indeed.  Yet, we know this not to be true, since we must now venture to the Academy, where we will listen to one of the great rhetoricians of our time, Yancicles.  Her gift for oratory was certainly bequeathed to her by the gods!

Travius:  Or has she gained it through practice?  Let us go to agora at Williams and attempt to discern this truth.