The
exigence of Ramus’ text is what he perceives to be a major theoretical
misunderstanding by Quintilian -- and thus of Cicero and Aristotle --
concerning the nature and position of invention. Specifically, he
believes the Quintilian has conflated the making of knowledge, which for
Ramus is the realm dialectic and invention, and the
organization/arrangement/presentation of that knowledge: “I repeat, he
[Quintilian] does not understand that invention is a process which
supplies arguments, whereas arrangement is a different process which
organizes arguments” (694). Throughout the text, he makes two
provocative claims about the study of rhetoric: 1) Ramus believes the
syllogism to be the most effective means of conveying logic and reason
and faults Quintilian’s text where he sees them absent. He employs
several throughout his text as a way of displaying their effectiveness;
2) to study rhetoric is to study the methods of persuasion.
The
culmination of these arguments is that Ramus uses his text to bifurcate
rhetoric and dialectic/ eloquence and invention. He claims, “therefore
there are only two parts to rhetoric, style and delivery” (685).
According to Ramus, “rhetoric should demonstrate the embellishment of
speech first in tropes and figures, second in dignified delivery” (684).
Inevitably, this privileges dialectic over rhetoric and assumes that
dialectic can happen without the employment of rhetoric, both of which
are problematic in contemporary conceptions of rhetoric. Additionally,
he conflates terms like art, practice, and method: “like any other
discipline, the theory of invention and arrangement must be practiced in
two ways: first, in order that by its means we should through external
examples learn common sense from argument, judgment from the manner of
conclusion, and complete prudence from the method of arrangement and
order; secondly, that by means of the same art we should devise similar
examples in reading and writing” (696).
However,
while Ramus is sometimes treated as the “bad guy” of rhetoric for this
split, it does accomplish one interesting goal: by separating dialectic
from rhetoric, Ramus establishes a need to study rhetoric (even though
he positions it only as the study of effective delivery or style). The
two intellectual activities require different skills, theories, and
practices, and must be studied in different ways. Also, Ramus seems
greatly connected to Plato’s understanding of rhetoric as language
moving the will or the soul, because of the ways in which he establishes
rhetoric as the movement of the will or the bringing to knowledge. In
this framework, the rhetor must have a methodical way of understanding
and catering to certain audiences. This closely links him to the
classical tradition from which he attempts to distance himself.
In
sum, Ramus makes the claim that what Aristotle divides into sections of
rhetoric is, in reality, a farce, as what he is dividing happens to be
not rhetoric itself as an art but rather the conversation of rhetoric
and dialectic, which Ramus points out as two different concepts.
Dialectic and rhetoric do work together, Ramus points out, but rather it
is the training in ethics that would be necessary in learning about
emotions and stirring emotions as an orator. The question that arises
out of Ramus’ argument is how emotions do play into rhetoric, or if they
do only through ethics and not dialectic. While he makes a case in
point for dividing dialectic and rhetoric, he leaves out the place of
pathos.
Additionally,
Ramus points to the fact that Aristotle questions scientific evidence
and says that it is not an argument, and that science is not part of
rhetoric, which Ramus dismisses and explains is part of dialectic, in
which science has more of a firm ground. Thus, by saying this Ramus is
discrediting Aristotle and saying that science and scientific proof is
very much part of rhetoric because dialectic bonds with rhetoric, and
thus if dialectic refers also to scientific proof, scientific proof
would be part of rhetoric as well. This begs the question of how Ramus
explains his earlier statement, then, of defining rhetoric an art and
yet, in play with dialectic, becomes not invention, which he states is
dialectic, but in fact scientific proof.
Conversely,
Astell makes a strong case for morality, virtue, and ethics in
rhetoric, although both Ramus and Astell seem to agree that rhetoric can
be used for good or ill needs, unlike their more optimistic
forefathers.
Early
in this selection, Astell puts forward a somewhat radical call to
action for women, inviting them into more public services. Although
Astell still ascribes traditional feminine roles and values to her
female audience, she also invokes a sense of empowerment. In a rather
lengthy address she claims that her female audience is quite capable of
making positive change in their own lives and their communities should
they commit to making such a change. Moreover, she asserts that women
have wasted time learning trivialities of life instead of important
material. She contends that with some education about the nature of
virtuousness women can be powerful allies for the church and society as
conversational rhetors.
Astell
defines rhetoric as the act of revealing a truth or removing
obfuscations to allow another to see the truth. Through her exploration
of women’s rhetoric, Astell demonstrates that rhetoric may serve
different ends based not only on the needs of an audience, but on the
position of the rhetor. Astell claims that women have a unique
opportunity to use rhetoric to enlighten others to truth or to convert
them to Christianity; a single woman, she writes, is mother to the world
and is always capable of nurturing its citizens. Unlike men’s rhetoric,
which is public and political, women’s rhetoric is more often exercised
in conversation, charity, and religion in order to promote good, truth,
and solidarity among women. This is a rhetoric that privileges simple
and plain language, as Astell sees fanciful or complicated words as an
attempt to trick and audience. Instead, Astell’s rhetoric involves heavy
reliance on ethos and her own moral character as a “woman of God,”
whose speech serves to represent a true and good reality. Importantly,
Astell asserts that rhetoric is available or accessible to all people as
all people are capable of reason and reasonable thought. She also
asserts that writing and spoken rhetoric may follow the same styles and
arrangements as she does not find them to be different arts, signaling
the growing value of writing and its shrinking inferiority to speech
making.
Like
Plato, Astell sees rhetoric as building on a true, obvious, and holy
“good.” She strengthens the bond between rhetoric and religious
practice, the soul, and spiritual enlightenment. However, Astell also
provides a new nuance to early understandings of rhetorics by broadening
the role of rhetor. In seeing women as rhetors, Astell opens a space
for women to share stories and projects, perhaps laying the groundwork
for girls’ schools and other civil service projects. Astell also seems
to valorize traditionally feminine traits, such as tenderness, as they
may have a benefit for the larger community and not just the family.
Although Platonic principles of utility and holiness may still be in
play, Astell’s work broadens the categories and softens some boundaries.
Too, Astell’s claim that rhetoric is available to all further broadens
concepts of rhetor, audience, and purpose.
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