Making New Distinctions; Expanding Our Scope

The contradictions demonstrated in regard to previously drawn distinctions between classical and modern rhetoric that Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede point out are quite illuminating; they quite clearly demonstrate that accusations of classical rhetoric being entirely centered on logic yet also reliant on emotion and coercive are a direct contradiction.  As Lunsford and Ede note:

…they resolve to two contradictory claims about the nature of classical rhetoric.  The first two distinctions, which view the classical image of man as a rational being and the logical proofs as supreme, discount classical rhetoric as too rationalistic.  The latter two, which present the rhetor-audience relationship in classical rhetoric as antagonistic and unidirectional and its goal as persuasion…discount classical rhetoric as too dependent upon emotional manipulation and coercion. (39-40) 

I found it quite intriguing that I never picked up on this until Lunsford and Ede pointed it out.  This contradiction is quite apparent when the claims are presented together; however, it is not easily noticeable when the claims are made separately.  Furthermore, one of the main distinctions that Lunsford and Ede make is, in my estimation, the key difference between the two.  They claim that other distinctions are not accurate and that the primary difference is one of epistemology.  This main distinction “…concerns the nature and status of knowledge” (46).  This seems to be the essential difference between classical and modern rhetoric and directly pertains to notions of “Truth.”  Classical rhetoric believed in a universal, inherent knowledge that reflected a real “Truth.”  This ultimate “Truth” is not universal throughout—Lunsford and Ede note that while Plato saw the rhetor as leading others to this “Truth,” Aristotle divided knowledge as necessary and contingent and saw rhetoric’s domain as that of contingent knowledge.

However, in spite of these differences between Plato and Aristotle, modern rhetoric is skeptical of any universal truths and views our conceptions of reality and “Truth” as socially constructed, as necessarily attached to our language practices.  In that manner, “…reality is not so much discovered or discoverable as it is constituted by the interplay of thought and language” (47).  This is the more apt distinction—modern rhetoric views knowledge and, more specifically, “Truth” as not discovered through rhetoric but actually created through rhetoric.  

While James Zappan’s article “Digital Rhetoric:  Toward an Integrated Theory” demonstrates how the digital age is affecting rhetorical practices, I still believe the main distinctions Lunsford and Ede draw are applicable.  Knowledge and “Truth” are still heavily reliant on rhetoric; however, the affordances of various digital media definitely complicate matters.  Digital rhetoric offers faster and wider-spread circulation, the ability to communicate and connect with others across large distances, and interactive approaches.  Most intriguingly, digital rhetoric also can afford differing degrees of anonymity, which is quite fascinating (321).  In light of this, the scope of modern rhetoric needs to be broadened to consider the affordances and constraints new media brings into play.  I agree with Zappan that “A theory of digital rhetoric that recognizes how the traditional rhetoric of persuasion is being transformed in digital spaces invites such questions and thus offers new opportunities for inquiry in rhetorical theory and criticism…” (324).  Hence, considerations of digital rhetoric do not require major revisions of rhetorical theory—it seems more appropriate to consider that digital rhetoric requires expansion of rhetorical theory to encompass the ever-expanding ways that we make meaning and create knowledge in our modern world.