Pointing
out the inaccuracy of four typically accepted distinctions between classical
and modern rhetoric, Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede put forward three different
distinctions between classical and modern rhetoric, which are interestingly
based on three similarities between classical and modern rhetoric they value.
Their
article is undoubtedly thought-provoking. However, their distinctions also seem
simplified. As their discussion centers on Aristotle (“because the Aristotelian
theory is the most complete of all classical rhetorics” (40)), my first
question is to what extent can Aristotle represent the classical rhetoric.
Admittedly, Aristotle is very influential and his systematic theory lays the
foundation for the long tradition of rhetoric. But when one of Lunsford and Ede’s
distinctions is based on Aristotle’s concept of knowledge, whether Aristotle’s
theory alone can represent classical rhetoric becomes a question. According to Lunsford
and Ede, one difference between classical and modern rhetoric lies in that in Aristotle’s
world, knowledge results in clarity and certainty (“rhetor and audience come
into a state of knowing which places them in a clearly defined relationship
with the world and with each other”) while for modern rhetoric the nature of
knowledge itself is questionable – knowing is never objective, always based on
a human perspective (47). Moreover, in Aristotle’s system, there are two types
of knowledge – knowledge of the necessary and knowledge of the contingent, and
for Aristotle “Rhetoric’s realm is limited to the contingent” (47). Thus, Lunsford
and Ede’s second distinction between classical and modern rhetoric is based on
Aristotle’s rhetoric related to knowledge of the contingent, which I am afraid
would not justly reflect classical rhetoric. Anyone familiar with Plato who is
also very influential and echoed by Weaver later, would remember that for Plato
rhetoric is a means to pursue real truth and absolute knowledge and though some
people (like philosophers) can remember absolute knowledge they knew before in
heaven, some other people fail. For Plato, rhetoric is also “the art of persuasion”
(157), but it is a very different type of persuasion that “leads the soul by
means of words” (156). In this sense, it might not be fair to equate Aristotle
with classical rhetoric.
On
the second place, Lunsford and Ede’s distinctions also seem ambiguous. Their
first distinction is based on the similarity that “Both classical and modern
rhetoric view man as a language-using animal” (45). Lunsford and Ede believe
Aristotle’s works “indicate that Aristotle was aware of man’s ability to use
symbols and that he viewed language as the medium through which judgment about
the world are communicated” (45). Though in Rhetoric
Aristotle talks about style and metaphor, language is not the focus of his
rhetoric. And considering scholars such as Richards, Gates, and Bakhtin who
analyze language in depth, it is difficult to say Aristotle’s awareness of symbol-using and language
as the medium is comparable to the works of modern rhetoric. A major difference
between classical and modern rhetoric, in my view, lies in modern rhetoric’s examination
of language and its role in generating knowledge. While Lunsford and Ede stress
viewing “man as a language-using animal” (45) as the similarity between classical
and modern rhetoric and blur their difference, the importance of their
corresponding distinction remains unexplained. They claim that “Aristotle
addresses himself primarily to the oral use of language; our is primarily an
age of print” (45). In Aristotle’s time, writing was still a new technology and
he focused on speaking. We may say this distinction is primarily because of the
limit of historical conditions. If Aristotle were born much later, he might
have created a very different system of rhetoric. But what does this
distinction mean? Why is it important? How is this related to the study of
language? Does modern rhetoric simply ignore speech? How has an emphasis on
written discourse shaped our understanding of rhetoric? Lunsford and Ede
believe that this distinction is “potentially profound” (46) but refuse to
explain why by stating that “Our understanding of the historical and
methodological ramifications of the speaking/ writing distinction has been
hampered by the twentieth-century split among speech, linguistics, philosophy,
and English departments” (46). They indeed found an important fact, but without
explanation, the meaning of this distinction remains ambiguous.
Similarly,
before discussing the second distinction, Lunsford and Ede point out the second
similarity that “rhetor and audience may jointly have access to knowledge”
(45), which blurs another important difference that their second distinction
avoids addressing. The word “jointly” makes the relationship between rhetor and
audience rather ambiguous. In classical rhetoric, it is easier to find a
hierarchy – a rhetor can be intellectually or morally better than the audience.
Plato’s Phaedrus depicts Socrates as
a wise man who skillfully guides a passive, obedient listener. Aristotle’s
rhetor should receive good training while the audience are “untrained thinkers”
(183). Quintilian believes a “good man speaking well” (8). Also, classical rhetoric
is not open to every citizen. In modern rhetoric, not only is the nature of
knowledge questioned, but the relationship between rhetor and audience is
changed. Foucault reveals the social structure and power relations in discourse
as well as ideologies existing in knowledge, giving both rhetor and audience
the opportunity to realize and change their positions. Bakhtin emphasizes
dialogue, which allows the rhetor and the audience communicate with each other
more equally. Gates, Anzaldua, and Campbell strive to add a new population to rhetoric
and issues related to race, gender, and culture get more attention. Valuing
participation, digital rhetoric in the 21st century may lead to a
more democratic relationship between rhetor and audience. Hence, though I agree
that modern rhetoric begins to question the nature of knowledge, classical
rhetoric does not simply place rhetor and audience “in a clearly defined relationship
with the world and with each other” (45). The more important distinction lies
in that in modern rhetoric things like who can be a rhetor, who is the
audience, and what kind of relationship they can have are rediscovered and
redefined.
Finally,
it cannot be ignored that the scope of modern rhetoric is radically different
from the scope of classical rhetoric. Though Lunsford and Ede emphasize that
Aristotle’s persuasion cannot be understood in a narrow sense (44), which also
includes interaction, modern rhetoric covers much more than persuasion.
Richards sees rhetoric as exposition and communication; Burke introduces
identification to rhetoric; Foucault and Bakhtin bring in discourse and
dialogue; Gates, Anzaldua, and Campbell add race, gender, culture and identity.
More interestingly, James Zappen’s “Digital Rhetoric: Toward an Integrated
Theory” reveals a new field. The new digital media may lead to numerous new
possibilities and change our current understanding of rhetoric. For example,
the new goal of rhetoric can be “self-expression, participation, and creative
collaboration” (321) as the new digital space gives individuals more freedom
and results in a participatory culture. The traditional division between reader
and author is also challenged because in video games, players can be authors
and readers at the same time (322). And rhetoric begins to include “both the
Web author’s choices of topics, arguments, sequences, and words and the reader’s
processes of selection and semiosis” (322). Even interaction has a different
meaning now: “interactions among multiple versions of our online selves and
between these and our real selves” play an important role in identity formation,
which points in a new direction for rhetoric. Therefore, though we may use the
same word, it is clear that Aristotle’s interaction is essentially different
from interaction in the digital age.
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